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This dissertation is comprised of two chapters that investigate the long-term effects of a
quota policy for women in local government in India.

Chapter 1 In the first chapter, “Political Inclusion and Educational Investment,” I investigate whether political empowerment can affect the human capital investment decisions
of children. By using exogenous variation in the implementation of the policy, nationallyrepresentative survey data allow me to estimate effects on educational enrollment in a geographic discontinuity design using adjacent areas on either side of a state border as counterfactuals receiving different levels of exposure to the quota policy.
In this paper, I find a sizable increase in the enrollment rates of both female and male
school-age children resulting from additional exposure to local female leaders. I find that the
effects are particularly concentrated among poorer households and those with less-educated
proximate role models, and were commensurate with reductions in idle time and employment
in household enterprises. There is no evidence for enrollment increases being facilitated by
changes in school infrastructure, the labor market, or indicators related to intra-household
dynamics. Overall, this paper makes a broader contribution to the literature in taking seriously the need to evaluate the external validity of experimental studies. Earlier work on
this topic has focused on evaluating the same quota policy in a geographically restricted
setting, with the added benefit of high internal validity but at the risk of the findings potentially being limited in their generalizability to the country as a whole. This chapter seeks

v
to understand whether these earlier results do generalize, and if so, where and among which
populations. While I find similar effects on enrollment among young women, I also find that
the increase in scope reveals increases in enrollment among young men as well, which had
not previously been found. This opens the potential for future work investigating the reasons
for this response among young men.

Chapter 2 The second chapter asks how the quota policy in local government affected
participation and representation in higher levels of government over time. This study is
motivated by the argument that quota policies have the potential to increase the participation
of targeted groups even after they are no longer in place, or in environments not directly
subject to quotas. I test this argument empirically using variation over a span of 15 years
in the assignment of one-third of powerful leadership seats in Indian local government being
randomly held by women. Quotas increase the number of female candidates who later
contest seats in state and national legislatures, where such policies do not exist. The effects
can be explained by repeat candidacies of career politicians (indirect evidence of a response to
changed voter preferences) and new candidacies by politicians who gain particular experience
from the quotas (a candidate supply effect). Effect magnitudes imply that the policy accounts
for a substantial portion of the increase in female candidates in these bodies since the start of
the policy. Quotas do not induce permanent change in the presence of female candidates in
higher office due to the low probability of a female candidate winning an election, and effects
on candidacy subsiding over time. This paper adds to the literature by evaluating the effect
of quota policies on the broader occupation of political public service by taking a careerbased view of the potential for quotas to have lasting effects on the individual beneficiaries
and same-group members in the long term.
The two papers further elucidate the potential for quota policies to have effects beyond
the immediate environments to which they are applied. Such evaluations are particularly
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important to fully understand the range of unintended consequences – be they negative
or positive – of social and economic policies enacted in developing countries and among
marginalized populations.
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Chapter 1
Political Inclusion and Educational
Investment
1.1

Introduction

Many countries enact policies to increase the social and economic participation of historically
disadvantaged groups. In India, a one-third seat quota for women in local government has
been in place since the early 1990s; however, mandated seat or candidate quotas in elected
bodies are common elsewhere as well, having been legislated in over 90 countries as of 2015.1
Given the popularity of such policies, it is important to thoroughly understand the many
dimensions of effects that a changed leadership composition may have on the well-being of
constituents. Recent work has shown substantive effects of the India quota policy for women
in local government outside the particular environment to which it has been applied. These
effects have been found among children’s school enrollment and aspirations (Beaman et al.,
2012a), crime reporting (Iyer et al., 2012a), small-scale business creation (Ghani et al., 2014),
and sex selection (Kalsi, 2015), among others.
1

Author’s calculations based on data from The Quota Project (2015).
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In this paper, I investigate long-term effects of the Indian seat reservation policy on
school enrollment rates of young constituents. Motivated by the findings of Beaman et al.
(2009), who examine the effects of exposure to women in village-level leadership positions
on educational enrollment and aspirations in a sample of villages in one state of India, the
current work uses nationally representative survey data and a quasi-experimental identification strategy exploiting geographic discontinuities in policy exposure to identify effects
of exposure to the quota policy. This analysis provides important insight into the degree
to which political quota policies can affect educational decisions of children across a highly
heterogeneous country like India.
Human capital investment decisions are made amidst a complex set of factors that may
be slow to change, including long-held traditions and cultural beliefs, with immediate or
short-term effects being small or difficult to detect empirically. For this reason, I follow
earlier studies estimating effects of local political leaders on educational enrollment using
cumulative differences in policy exposure arising over a period of 15 years. This exposure
measure arises from the staggered state-level implementation of the quota policy first used
by Iyer et al. (2012a), and more recently by Ghani et al. (2014) and Kalsi (2015).
I first approach the estimation of policy effects on enrollment rates as an event study,
allowing for an unrestricted view of differences in the evolution of enrollment rates over time
relative to policy implementation. I then implement a geographic discontinuity design in
which contiguous areas spanning state borders are used to remove persistent unobservables
in the estimation of causal effects on enrollment. Mirroring the event study estimates, the
border identification strategy finds effects of the policy on enrollment rates of both young
women and young men – on the order of one to two percentage points (approximately 0.05
-0.10 standard deviations) per additional year of exposure. These effects are substantial in
view of pre-policy enrollment rates and the average policy exposure of just over ten years as
of the period of analysis.
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Rich information on household characteristics and composition available in the survey
data is used to show that effects were strongest among more economically disadvantaged individuals and those who were from families with uneducated adult women. Using additional
detail on labor force participation and household responsibilities, I find that enrollment increases were effected though reductions in idle time and non-labor force household duties.
There was also a shift out of household-based employment, although the magnitude of reduction is smaller and less pervasive across groups than reductions in other activities. Despite a
nontrivial share of children engaged in the labor force, particularly among poorer households,
this does not appear to be the primary margin from which enrollment gains were seen.
I then examine potential channels by which political seat quotas can affect educational
decisions. Using detailed administrative data on school infrastructure, I show that there is no
evidence of increases in either the extensive or intensive margins of schooling infrastructure
resulting from longer exposure to seat quotas. I also find no effects in the labor market or
among other typical indicators of women’s empowerment.
While the core findings of this paper mirror those of Beaman et al. (2012a) in pattern
and magnitude for young women, I provide several contributions. The first is to substantially extend the generalizability of results found in Beaman et al. (2012a) to the national
level using quasi-experimental identification strategies. This is important in view of the substantial heterogeneity across regions of India and the need for continued assessment of the
external validity of findings from pioneering experimental studies. Second, I shed light on
the activities displaced by increased enrollment following the policy, as well as use schooling
infrastructure data and labor force surveys to test alternative hypotheses regarding public
goods provision and direct effects on the labor market. The lack of evidence for these channels further supports the notion that local leaders change educational decisions by serving as
“role model” and potentially changing perceived returns to education. Finally, the finding
of effects among young men in a slightly older age cohort highlights the potential for future
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research on dynamic responses to increased educational attainment by women in this and
other contexts.
The following section describes essential aspects of the reservations policy and related
literature. I then discuss the data and the empirical methodology, and present results from
the event study and border identification strategy. This is followed by an investigation into
heterogeneous effects, displaced activities, and causal channels. The final section concludes
with a discussion of how results complement the findings of earlier literature, and avenues
for future research.

1.2

India’s 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act

Passed in 1992, India’s 73rd Constitutional Amendment formalized national support for
an historical, decentralized governance structure known as the panchayat. Importantly for
this study, the 73rd Amendment instituted a three-tiered system of local government at
the village, sub-district (block), and district levels across rural areas of the country that
included a one-third seat reservation at each governance level within local government to
be filled by women, and a proportionate seat share reserved for representatives from historically marginalized social groups (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, hereafter noted by
“SC/ST”). For further detail on this history and implementation of the 73rd Amendment, I
refer the reader to studies that examine this policy and its effects (Beaman et al. (2012a),
Iyer et al. (2012a), Ghani et al. (2014), and Kalsi (2015), among others).
As detailed by Iyer et al. (2012a) and Ghani et al. (2014), the 73rd Amendment stipulated
that states had the responsibility to adjust or amend local elections to comply with the
provisions of the Amendments, and nearly all states amended existing laws or passed new
laws to be compliant within one year. However, there is considerable variation in the timing
of these first elections across states. As first pointed out by Iyer et al. (2012a), this timing
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is plausibly exogenous due to state authorities waiting for the term of existing governing
bodies to expire. That is, most state governments waited for the term of office of incumbent
local officials to expire before conducting fresh elections in compliance with the provisions
of the reform.
Once the provisions of the reform were implemented, one-third of seats were reserved
for women at each level of the three-tiered local governance hierarchy. Although comprehensive data do not exist for all states, available evidence confirms there was only minimal
involvement of women in local elected bodies prior to this reform (Mathew 2000). The policy
thus represented a substantial and sharp change in the participation on women in the public
sphere in rural India.
A number of studies have shown how decisions of a governance body adjust with the
application of quotas or other changes to their demographic composition. Using state-level
variation in India over four decades, Pande (2003) identifies how the mandated reservations
of legislative positions for minority groups increased the redistribution of resources towards
these groups, demonstrating enhanced policy influence. Besley et al. (2004) found that
reservation of a leadership position for SC/ST individuals increased access among SC/ST
households to infrastructure and government services.
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004a) use information on the location of public goods to
show that when an area has leadership positions reserved for SC/ST individuals, the share
of public goods going to that group is significantly higher, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004b)
use village-level variation in political reservations for women to predict the type of public
goods provided in 265 reserved and unreserved villages in West Bengal and Rajasthan, finding
that leaders invest more in infrastructure that is directly relevant to the needs of their own
gender. However, these findings are less strong when extended to South India (Ban and
Rao 2008). Overall, the group identity of leaders has shown to matter in the type of public
goods provided under the purview of the governing body, and this has been established in
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various contexts not limited to the Indian case (e.g., Powley (2007), Washington (2008).
Duflo (2005) provides an assessment of the case for political reservations for women and
other historically-underrepresented groups, and, using evidence from India, concludes that
reservations incur a significant reallocation of public goods toward the preferred allocation of
the previously politically-underrepresented groups. Pande and Ford (2011) provide a recent
comprehensive review of the literature on gender quotas.
Additionally, the character and actions of governance bodies may influence those groups
with which they interact. Iyer et al. (2012a) find evidence that political empowerment resulted in greater reporting of crimes against women. Leaders from newly-empowered groups
may also change the perceptions of their group, potentially affecting an array of social and
economic outcomes. Beaman et al. (2009) show how perceptions of women improve once
men are exposed to women in leadership roles, providing substantial evidence in support of
the model of attitudes and bias implicit in Hoff and Stiglitz (2010).2 Ghani et al. (2014)
quantify the link between the timing of reservations and changes in women engaged in
India’s manufacturing sector, finding strong evidence of an increase in small-scale female
entrepreneurship.
The current work is also related to studies of the salience of returns to education. Jensen
(2010b) shows how the provision of information on returns to education in the Dominican
Republic affects enrollment, while Jensen (2010a) finds that knowledge (salience) of educational returns increases educational investment among girls. Linking these literatures,
Nguyen (2008) finds that role model identity matters in the effect of information on updating perceived returns to education: role models of similar backgrounds to students have a
larger impact on outcomes than role models of dissimilar backgrounds.
Earlier work on the relationship between political empowerment and education uses cross2

Hoff and Stiglitz (2010) develop a conceptual framework to show how changes in power, technology and
contacts with the outside world matter, especially because they can lead to changes in ideology.
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sectional variation to assess longer-term impacts of politicians on educational outcomes.
Clots-Figueras (2012) uses a regression discontinuity design based on closely won elections
between female and male candidates to show that the gender of politicians affects the educational levels of individuals who grow up in the districts where the politicians are elected.
The author finds that the election of women politicians did increase primary school completion and that this effect was primarily found in urban and not rural areas, but that the
effect was not statistically different for men versus women. Among a sample of households in
495 villages in West Bengal, Beaman et al. (2012a) examine the effects of randomly rotated
exposure to women in village-level leadership positions to identify effects on aspirations and
educational outcomes for girls, with differences in exposure across districts of up to 15 years
(three election cycles). Compared to villages that never had chairperson seats reserved for
women, the gender gap in aspirations closed by 25% in parents and 32% in adolescents in
villages assigned to a female leader for two election cycles (approximately ten years). The
gender gap in adolescent educational attainment is erased in these villages, and girls spend
less time on household chores. The authors find no evidence of changes in young women’s
labor market opportunities, using novel survey questions to attribute the impact of women
leaders to a “role model” effect. With a larger geographic scope, in this paper I follow the
conceptual approach of exploiting exogenous cross-sectional geographic variation in exposure to leaders to identify longer-term, cumulative effects of women leaders on educational
enrollment.

1.3

Data: Reservations Implementation and School Enrollment

Data on the timing of exposure to seat quotas comes from several publications documenting
the implementation and progress of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment (Mathew (1995),
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Mathew (2000), GOI 2008, (Iyer et al., 2012a), Kalsi (2015)). India’s National Sample Survey Organisation “Socio-Economic SurveySchedule 10: Employment and Unemployment”
provides data on enrollment (hereafter referred to as “NSS data”). The NSS data come
from a survey of a representative sample of households across all Indian states and union
territories approximately every five years, with the household sampling frame drawn from
the most recent population census and stratified within the rural and urban areas in each
district. The analyses use data from surveys in from 1983-84 to 2007-08, over which period
there were six survey rounds (additionally in 1987-88, 1993-94, 1999-2000, and 2004-5). For
simplicity, I refer to survey years only by the initial year.
India’s Employment/Unemployment schedule is akin to many household labor force surveys administered worldwide. Respondent households provide individual-level details on
demographics, employment, income and consumption particulars for all household members. The analysis exploits variation in the “usual principal activity” field, which among
other activities indicates whether the individual was currently “attending [an] educational
institution”. Beyond restricting to the sample of school-age children in rural areas of the
country, minimal data cleaning procedures were required aside from geographic definitions
being made consistent over time to account for changes in administrative boundaries and
the bifurcation of three states in 2001.
I use the 2007-8 survey year as the relevant outcome period for two reasons. First, after
2006-7 several states increased seat quotas for women in local government to a minimum of
50 percent. I thus restrict my analysis to the 2007-08 wave due to incomparability of the
policy measure and its exogeneity across states. Second, 2006-07 is the same period of study
in Beaman et al. (2012a), so any findings will be as temporally comparable as possible.
Table 1 shows trends in enrollment rates for various gender, age and social groups over
the period of study based on the NSS data. Since 1987 there has been close to 100 percent
enrollment in lower-primary school cohorts, motivating the restriction to individuals aged
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nine to 17 for whom enrollment may have been affected by the policy change. Among
the non-SC/ST population there has been substantial progress in enrollment rates in all
age cohorts between 1987 and 2007, with the 9-11 and 12-14 age brackets for young men
improving from 91 and 78 percent to 98 and 93 percent enrollment, respectively. In all age
groups, women lag in initial and ending levels, although increases in enrollment rates were
greater. In panel C, I calculate the educational enrollment gap. In the youngest school-age
cohort there is almost no gender gap in any of the years, while among older age cohorts the
gender gap has decreased substantially from 14 percentage points in 1987 to almost zero by
2007 in the 9-11 age group, and from 28 percent to 10 percent in the 12-14 age group over
the same period. The SC/ST group, having started at lower enrollment levels and with a
wider gender gap, saw faster increases in enrollment rates and reduction in the gender gap,
although by 2007 still not reaching full parity with same-age peers.3
In order to use state-level implementation as exogenous identifying variation, I first look
for evidence of whether the implementation timing across states was related to pre-period
enrollment rate levels or trends. Figure 1 shows separately the initial state-level enrollment
rates for the four sample groups by gender and social group in 1987 plotted against the
order in which states implemented the reservations, supporting that claim that the reform
implementation was exogenous to pre-period enrollment rate levels. The line in each panel is
virtually flat, indicating no detectable relationship between pre-implementation enrollment
rates and the subsequent timing of implementation across states.
Table 2 provides empirical support for parallel pre-trends in enrollment rates in the ten
years preceding the policy implementation by directly estimating the enrollment status of
individuals using data from the earliest available survey year (1983-84) through the year
3
Azam and Kingdon (2013) characterize for a recent period the extent and patterns of sex bias in education
in India. Notably, they find that pro-male gender bias exists in the primary school age group and increases
with age. The authors also find that the extent of pro-male gender bias in educational expenditure is
substantially greater in rural than in urban areas.
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of the reform passage (1993-94) with a linear trend term and an interaction of this trend
with the state-level year of implementation. State fixed effects absorb the main effect of
differential adoption years by state, and state-clustered standard errors correct for serial
correlation within states. A negative coefficient on the interaction term would indicate if
states that implemented the policy earlier also had more quickly rising enrollment rates prior
to the policy change. I find no evidence of this for any of the subgroups that are the focus
of the analysis, providing substantial evidence of the parallel trends assumption necessary
for identification from this staggered policy implementation.

1.4

Event Study Estimates

The event study approach allows for an unrestricted examination of the differences in enrollment rates in the years before and after the policy change. This permits observation of effects
of the policy that may be missed by standard difference-in-differences when longer-term dynamics may exist Wolfers (2006). The event study specification is typically represented by
the following equation, where k indexes years relative to the policy exposure:

enrolledist = δ0 +

X

Γk(st) + λs + γt + λs ∗ yeart + uist

(1.1)

k

In this equation, s indexes states, t indexes years, and Y earssinceimplementations,t is
defined as the number of years individual i in state s and year t is observed relative to policy
implementation in state s. The specification is typical of a standard difference-in-differences
approach, with the modification that the term indicating active treatment is expanded into
a vector of indicators in βk for different years relative to the policy implementation. Due to
the frequency of the survey I use, I am able to observe enrollment only at intervals of four
to six years, rather than annually, requiring the definition of k to correspond to a range of
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years corresponding to the (average) interval frequency of observation. Standard errors are
clustered by state and year corresponding to the definition of the vector of policy variables.
The year range spanning policy implementation in a given state is normalized to zero
as the omitted group, and an indicator function creates the leads and lags (for different
intervals) conditional on the year and state in which the respondent’s status is observed. To
limit concerns over an unbalanced state panel, states not observed in all five of the intervals
are removed from the sample (although this does not affect the results substantively).
Using six rounds of survey data from 1983 to 2007, Figure 2 presents the coefficient vector
β separately by sex for the sample of nine to 17 year-olds split by sex and social group. It is
important to note that a test of whether the state and year fixed effects effectively controlling
for differences across states leads the coefficient for the interval prior to implementation to
fluctuate around zero, and this is clearly visible in the panels of Figure 2. There is also a
clear pattern of enrollment increases among young women seen in the top two panels. These
are approximately on the order of one percentage point increase in enrollment per additional
year of exposure. There is also a slight upward trend among young men in the latter year
ranges, suggesting that exposure to the policy may potentially affect enrollment of male
enrollees in the longer term.
There are some of limitations to the event study approach. First, states have different
unobserved phenomena occurring over the period of study despite parallel pre-policy trends,
so there may be gains in terms of both bias reduction and increases in precision with the ability to either control for, or remove, additional unobservables. Particular to this context, the
approach does not allow for the isolation of effects of women leaders for the minority group,
who are subject to an additional quotas regime. In the next section, I outline an empirical
approach that allows parametric separation of both additional unobserved confounders and
quota regimes using the same exogenous variation in exposure.
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Identifying Effects Using Border Discontinuities

I now briefly motivate an approach aimed at addressing several of the limitations of the
event study discussed above. This approach will take advantage of discontinuities in the
cumulative level of exposure across neighboring districts lying across state borders in order
to estimate more precise long-term causal effects of the policy on enrollment rates. Consider
a set of administrative districts (indexed by j) within larger geographic areas (indexed by
k, not necessarily states). An equation relating policy exposure to enrollment rates in the
cross-section of districts can be expressed as the following:

enrollmentjk = δ0 + δ1 exposurejk + µk + jk

(1.2)

Where exposurejk captures the cumulative years of exposure to the policy, which varies
across districts j. The error term component µk contains unobservables common to the
area, while the district-specific disturbance term jk captures factors determining enrollments
which may be distinct across municipalities within the area but is exogenous to the policy
exposure.
The identifying assumption in equation (2) is that exposurejk is uncorrelated with the
error term; this assumption will be violated when area-level factors such as tradition, culture, or social norms remain unobservable (i.e., when µk cannot be separated from jk ) and
are correlated with policy exposure. If the variation in µk is comprised of unobserved determinants that do not particularly correspond to administrative boundaries, another method
of separating µk becomes necessary. One solution is to find areas with ostensibly common
characteristics but with differing levels of policy exposure such that a vector of fixed effects corresponding to µk would purge area-specific unobservables. In the current context,
adjacent districts lying on either side of a state border fulfill such criteria.4 The empirical
4

Similar identification strategies have been implemented in many contexts, recently by Michalopoulos
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strategy will thus exploit cross-state differences in exposure to the policy to identify causal
effects using cross-sectional variation across adjacent districts lying on either side of a state
border. Adjacent border district pairs then comprise the set of areas k while differences in
policy exposure can be used to identify effects of the policy on educational enrollment.
Districts typically have multiple cross-border neighbors, requiring some discussion of
process undertaken for assigning districts into pairs comprising the contiguous areas indexed
by k. The primary estimates come from a sample of cross-border pairs constructed to ensure
that each district appears in the sample only once, as part of one pair. When constructing
a pair for a given district from among multiple neighbors, the assignment to a pair is made
based on commonality on a set of observables from 1991 Population Census data (the rural
population share, the SC/ST population share, and the rural female literacy rate). The two
districts forming the “matched pair” are then included in the sample and removed from the
pool of possible matches for other districts. Each unique pair is thus comprised of the two
most similar districts among possible adjacency combinations. The empirical advantage of
this process is that a given district can appear only once in the estimation sample as part
of a unique pair, such that there is no mechanically-induced error term correlation resulting
from inclusion of the same district multiple times.5 Disadvantages to this approach are that,
as with any matching procedure, the choice of matching variables is chosen by the researcher,
and some border districts with only a single neighbor may never enter the sample (i.e., this
process results in an imperfect bipartite matching). In practice, whether non-duplicative
pair sets are constructed based on matching observables, or are randomly chosen among
multiple neighbors (more discussion below) does not make a substantive difference in the
pattern or magnitudes of the estimated policy effects, or conclusions therefrom. Below, I use
and Papaioannou (2014), Ghani et al. (2014), Jofre-Monseny (2012), Duranton et al. (2011), Naidu (2012),
Dube et al. (2010), and earlier by Holmes (1998).
5
A situation in which districts would appear multiple times would parallel matching “with replacement,”
where bootstrap adjustments for standard errors in the general context have been shown to be invalid for
matching estimators by Abadie and Imbens (2008).
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the covariate-matched sample to present preferred estimates, and then put these estimates
in the context of a range of likely effect sizes from the empirical distribution of coefficients
across randomly-generated matchings.
Sample weights are used to calculate sex- and group-specific district-level enrollment rates
in enrollmentjk , and Table 3 provides summary statistics across districts for the covariatematched sample. Appendix Table 1 provides evidence that border districts are similar to
interior districts in demographics and enrollment rates both prior to the policy change in
1987 and as of 2007.6 The identifying assumption when estimating equation (2) is given by:

E[jk |exposurejk ] = 0

(1.3)

Violations of this assumption are likely to come in the form of either persistent unobservables in jk that are not purged by area fixed effects µk , or concurrent phenomena affecting
enrollment confounded with exposurejk .
I first establish that the exposure measure is unrelated to observable district characteristics by regressing the exposure measure on 1991 values of the middle-school completion rates
of women, the SC/ST population share, the sex ratio, and the area’s urbanization level. I
also include measures of exposure to a large-scale national education program and state
progressive-party rule from 1992 to 2007. Using a specification analogous to equation (1),
Table 4 presents the coefficients on each of these measures in explaining eventual exposure
conditional on pair fixed effects. These are estimated separately in columns 1-6, and then
jointly in column 7. None of the measures individually predict exposure levels (implementation timing) and the joint hypothesis test of the coefficients in column 7 yields an F-statistic
of 1.04 (p-value: 0.44) providing further confirmation that the border districts used do not
6

There are different observation counts across measures due to some cells containing zero values in the
denominator; in general, these district pairs would be jointly very small in size and thus less important in
weighted regressions. In the estimations, district pairs missing values in any regressor are implicitly dropped.

CHAPTER 1. POLITICAL INCLUSION AND EDUCATIONAL INVESTMENT

15

exhibit any observable characteristics related to eventual exposure.
Table 5 contains the results of the estimation of equation (2) for non-minority group
women and men in column (1) of panels A and B, respectively. Coefficient magnitudes are
interpreted as the fractional increase in the enrollment rate per additional year of policy
exposure. The base specification implies that an additional year of exposure to the policy
increases the enrollment rate of non-SC/ST women by .7 percentage points. Pre-policy
enrollment rates for this sample was less than 50 percent (Table 3) and mean exposure
to the policy was 10.3 years, implying the policy played a substantial role in increasing
educational enrollment of young women. Panel B shows a commensurate effect of the policy
among young men in the same social group, corroborating the event study estimates and
suggesting the policy may have had effects on enrollment beyond just those on young women.
To further address identification concerns, I provide several specification variants after
estimating equation (2) directly. In column 2, I include the 1987 district enrollment rate
for the focal group to capture persistent differences not removed by the vector of area fixed
effects, µk . Next, I include in the specification measures of exposure to (a) a large-scale
national education program – the District Primary Education Program, or DPEP – that was
implemented across districts at different times, and (b) the number of years of progressiveparty rule in the state. Finally, I add to the prior specification the series of additional area
characteristics to further test sensitivity of the results. None of the estimates are particularly
sensitive to these controls, so for simplicity I refer to those estimates that only control for
the pre-period enrollment rate as the preferred specifications (column 2). I estimate district
enrollment rates by group as of 2007, with the main regressor being the years of exposure to
the 73rd Amendment provisions as of 2007.
Because there were concurrent population-proportionate quotas for ethnic minorities in
local government, it is necessary to separate the effects of the different spheres of reservation
for those in ethnic minority groups by interacting the minority population share with the
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cumulative years of exposure to the policy. In this specification, the main policy regressor
can then be interpreted as the isolated effect of exposure to women leaders. Table 6 contains
these estimates for the SC/ST sample, showing larger (although less precisely estimated)
effects among young women (Panel A) and again among men (Panel B).
The effects of exposure to women leaders on enrollment are substantial for SC/ST children
as well. The point estimate is substantially larger for young SC/ST women compared to
the effect in Table 5, potentially reflecting the greater disparity in enrollment faced by
SC/ST groups; in aggregate, this magnitude he the potential to explain the vast majority
of the increase in female SC/ST enrollment rates, as well as the rapid closure of the gender
enrollment gap, over the study period.
The primary estimates are robust to several alternative approaches. First, coefficient
estimates and patterns across samples are unchanged when weighting districts by the log of
population or Winsorizing the dependent variable at either one or five percent. Falsification
tests based on placebo variation in state implementation timing indicate the magnitude and
significance of the effects are unlikely to arise by chance, and the estimates are not sensitive
to the inclusion of any particular state.7

1.5.1

Alternative sample construction and effect sizes

To address the loss of some border districts in constructing the matched sample and the choice
of matching variables, I construct 500 matched-pair samples where in each sample, districts
with multiple cross-border neighbors were randomly matched among the set of adjacencies
(and then removed from the pool) to form unique pairs. Each sample then results in a set
point estimates for the four groups comparable to those in column 2 of Tables 5 and 6. This
approach reflects the range of potential effect sizes, as well as recognizes important researcherdriven choices in sample construction and the use of split samples for inference (Fafchamps
7

These robustness checks are available from the author upon request.
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and Labonne (2016).8 In aggregate, this approach thus loses no information contained in
border districts and does not rely on the researcher’s choice of matching variables.
Table 7 contains a summary of the distribution of coefficient magnitudes estimates across
the 500 samples and includes for comparison the point estimates and confidence intervals
from the preferred specification in Tables 5 and 6. The repeat sample analysis confirms that
the effect magnitudes and patterns across subsamples in the primary estimates in Tables 5
and 6 based on matched pairs are not particular outliers in the distribution of effect sizes
across samples. The one group with a point estimate (column 1) that is substantially larger
than the median coefficient and confidence interval form the multi-sample approach is that
for non-minority group men, suggesting some moderation in the interpretation of the effect
size for the group among the primary estimates.

1.5.2

Heterogeneity by age group and comparison with previous
findings

The positive effects among young men require some discussion, particularly in relation to
earlier studies that analyzed enrollment among a sample of villages in West Bengal and found
no effects among young men (Beaman et al., 2009). Beyond a different geographic sample, it
should first be clear that there are several important differences in the policy variation used
to estimate effects on enrollment: Beaman et al. (2012a) use variation in leadership seats at
the village level of the panchayat system, while the policy exposure used in the current work
implicitly captures exposure to reserved seats in the non-leadership body of the panchayats
(in addition to leaders), at all levels of the structure. Nevertheless, some of the difference in
the results for men may be explained by sampling: when restricting the nationwide analysis
8

In their work addressing the invalidity of the bootstrap in matching estimators, Abadie and Imbens
(2008) point to the approach of Politis and Romano (1994), who suggest the construction of confidence
regions based on subsamples as a valid inferential method.
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above to only the 11-15 age group, effect magnitudes among young women persist, whereas
for young men they disappear entirely. There is evidence of parameter hetoerogeneity by
age group among both men and women, with the largest policy effect among young women
roughly corresponding to the 11-15 age range, while for men there is no substantial effect
among this group but is rather found in the upper secondary age range of 16 and 17 years
old. Appendix Table 2 shows the results of the preferred specification estimated for a pooled
sample across social groups. Panel A considers the overall enrollment rate for the 9-17 age
range, While Panels B, C and D contain results from the estimation of enrollment rates for
the 9-10, 11-15, and 16-17 age ranges, respectively. This suggests that while women leaders
may have played a substantial role in closing the gender enrollment gap for ages 11-15, there
is a strong and robust enrollment increase among men of upper secondary age. While the
middle school educational enrollment gap may have closed as a result of the policy, this is
less so for the enrollment gap in upper secondary school, or educational attainment overall.
Thus a more nuanced finding emerges when expanding the sample to all pre-university-age
adolescents.

1.5.3

Displaced activities and heterogeneous effects

This section presents analysis of the activities displaced by the increase in enrollment, and
heterogeneous effects within the population. Using information on the other activities respondents may claim as their principal use of time available in the NSS data, I am able to
investigate which other activities experienced a commensurate reduction among school-age
children. After making alternative activities consistent across surveys, there are four possible other uses of time that respondents may claim as their principal activity. Three are
traditional labor force activities (working in a household enterprise, wage work in a nonhousehold enterprise, or “looking for work”), while the final category comprises non-wage,
non-labor force domestic duties. Tables 8 and 9 present estimations of the preferred spec-
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ification (including only the pre-policy control) across the different activities and samples.
Containing estimates for non-SC/ST women and men, Table 8 shows that those of higher
social groups saw increased enrollment among individuals who would have otherwise engaged
in household production or been idle; Table 9 shows that this pattern is not the same among
lower social groups, as shifts towards enrollment come only from those who would have been
idle or engaged in non-wage household duties despite a larger share of children engaged in
household-based employment. This suggests that while the reservations policy appeared to
have a uniformly positive effect across all subsamples, this force may not have been strong
enough to overcome the immediate opportunity cost of household production for those in
lower castes and the availability of household labor remains is a persistent barrier to educational enrollment among more disadvantaged groups. This suggests that household labor
may be a persistent barrier to educational enrollment among more disadvantaged groups, at
least in terms of responsiveness to the focal policy (see Basu and Van (1998) for a theoretical
discussion). While further investigation of these differences is left for future work, patterns
across samples in shifts in time use linked to policy exposure suggest attention be paid to
shifts in time-use alternatives to schooling across distinct subsamples of the population.
I next use the rich cross-sectional nature of the survey data to investigate additional
parameter heterogeneity. I estimate the preferred specification for samples differentiating
individuals by age group, by their household’s relative income level and by a proxy for
initial expectations for educational attainment via the highest education level among adult
women in the household. Table 10 presents these estimates, showing that for both groups
of women, the quotas appeared to affect enrollment at the well-known age range of 12 and
above for girls dropping out of school. There are no clear patterns in differential effects across
relative income levels, although there is some tendency for a stronger effect among children
from poorer families. Most importantly, however, is the pattern across young women in the
effects when the sample is split by the highest education of adult female household members.
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Across both groups, policy effects are concentrated among young women in families that
had uneducated (illiterate) older women in the householdthose young women that had lesseducated initial proximate female role models. This suggests a potential causal channel by
which leaders may affect educational investment as one which particularly operates among
those who had lower initial expected educational attainment and returns to education.

1.6

Testing causal channels of school infrastructure,
the labor market, and household bargaining

Various mechanisms potentially contribute to the link between political and economic empowerment, including infrastructure and public goods provision (Chattopadhyay and Duflo
(2004a, b), labor market effects, women’s bargaining power (Schultz 2001) or aspirations
(Beaman et al., 2009). In the following section, I investigate and discuss these hypotheses as potential channels by which the effects of a changed local leadership composition on
educational enrollment may arise.

1.6.1

School provision

Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004a) find that the gender of local leaders affects the public
goods provided in a community, and that women leaders direct public spending to infrastructure that is more relevant to their own gender. Earlier work has shown that male and
female leaders have different policy preferences; a conceptual extension would suggest differential provision of schooling infrastructure if women leaders indeed prefer educational
infrastructure more so than male leaders. To investigate whether educational infrastructure
provision was caused by longer exposure to the 73rd Amendment reforms, I use data from
India’s “District Report Cards” provided by the District Information System for Education
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(DISE). Since 2000-01, this agency has annually compiled district-level data on over 400
education-related indicators. For the purpose of parsimony, I constructed a small set of
variables from the DISE data that allow me to test hypotheses regarding the extensive and
intensive margins of schooling infrastructure, including schools per thousand persons, new
schools established per thousand persons since 1995, teachers per pupil and the share of
classrooms in good condition. I also capture a set of measures related to the experience of
girls in schools, particularly the share of schools that have a separate girls’ lavatory and the
share of teachers who are female. Using the 2007-08 DISE data, Table 11 shows the results
of estimating equation (1) using these schooling indicators as the outcome. Each column
in Table 9 shows the coefficient on the difference in exposure using the dependent variable
indicated. For the extensive margin, the preferred measure (rural schools per thousand rural
population) does not appear to be correlated to a longer exposure gap.9 While there is
some evidence that teacher-to-pupil ratios were commensurate with the enrollment increases
induced by the policy (by nature of a non-negative estimated effect), this is estimated imprecisely and the hiring of teachers may mechanically follow from increased enrollment,
rather than precede it. Finally, among gender-related factors, there is no relationship between female-friendly facilities or higher female share of teachers and longer policy exposure.
Overall, minimal evidence, if any, of an increase in educational infrastructure associated with
longer exposure to the reform.10
9

Results of this analysis are not sensitive to inclusion or exclusion of the 1987 enrollment difference as a
control.
10
These results appear to contrast with those of Clots-Figueras (2012). In particular, Clots-Figueras (2012)
found that women leaders increased educational enrollment in urban but not rural areas, and among both
boys and girls, and this effect occurred through greater provision of schooling infrastructure. In my paper,
I find effects for girls only, and rule out schooling provision as a mechanism for this to occur. It may not
be reasonable, however, to compare the two studies directly: Clots-Figueras (2012) studies a substantially
earlier time period in India when enrollment rates were substantially lower and the electoral context was
absent any seat quota system. For this reason, incentives regarding the provision of public goods, as well as
constituents’ perception of women leaders, are likely to be different in the two contexts.
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Labor market effects and contemporaneous returns to education

Labor market dynamics making women’s work more valuable may affect educational decisions of young women in two ways: via increased incomes of adult women changing relative
intra-household bargaining power, and by increasing the returns to education for women.
A long literature has looked at gender-differentiated effects of household income as well as
the role of female earnings and bargaining power on educational attainment.11 Table 12
investigates a range of labor market, marriage and household bargaining power indicators
(available from the NSS data) in the same border framework to determine whether these
factors appear related to longer exposure to the quota policy. These include measures of
women’s labor force participation, probability of marriage, and, conditional on being married, number of children, age at first birth, husband’s education, the product of husband’s
and wife’s education, and husband’s wage. This analysis purposively uses the sample of rural
women from an older cohort (25-35 years old) whose educational decisions were complete
or near-complete by the time of the 73rd Amendment and its implementation, allowing me
to investigate effects absent changes in educational attainment brought about by the policy.
Congruent with earlier studies, there is little evidence of changed labor market, marriage or
11

Among others, Edmonds and Pavcnik (2002) use a panel dataset of Vietnamese households to show
that exogenous changes in household income though rice prices cause a reduction in child labor, and these
reductions are largest for girls of secondary-school age and correspond to a commensurate increase in school
attendance for the group; for female bargaining power, I.E. (2008) finds a pronounced effect of social security
benefits on female child labor when benefits go to female household members.
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household dynamics associated with longer exposure to the quota policy.1213

1.7

Conclusion

This paper assesses the relationship between political inclusion and human capital investment of young constituents, finding that India’s flagship political empowerment policy mandating representation quotas for women in local government increased post-primary school
enrollment rates of adolescent girls and boys. The empirical strategy undertaken provides a
method for assessing the long-term impacts of mandated seat quotas in a general context and
using administrative data, as it takes advantage of a design naturally arising from constraints
likely to be faced when similar policies are enacted and result in staggered implementation
due to asynchronous policy implementation across jurisdictions.
In the same framework, I also examine mechanisms that could allow women leaders to
affect the educational decisions of young constituents in the same framework using information on labor force activities and schooling infrastructure. I find no evidence of effects among
schooling infrastructure, the labor market, or indicators of women’s status in the household.
12

Two recent studies provide some evidence that seat quotas in India affected labor market opportunities
for adult women. Ghani et al. (2014) find short-run effects of political reservations caused an increase in
women-owned establishments created in the unorganized manufacturing sector, particularly in traditional
and household-based industries, relative to new male-owned establishments. In the public sector, longer cumulative exposure to women leaders increased the share of government-provided employment given to women
at the introduction of a national rural employment guarantee scheme over the period of 2005-2008 (Ghani
et al. (2013). The share of women participating in either of these specific labor force activities is relatively
small, however, and unlikely to appear as large changes when considering the labor force participation or
activities of all women.
13
Beyond bargaining power, expanded labor force activities available to women may change incentives
for parents to invest in daughters. A substantial literature investigates the role of demand-side factors
changing the underlying valuation of education for girls in LDCs. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) find that
the expansion of the financial sector and other white collar industries caused enrollment in English language
schools to increase for girls (but not boys). Similarly, Oster and Millett (2011) show that the introduction
of a call center in towns in southern India generated large increases in school enrolment for both boys and
girls. Shastry (2010) finds that the information technology sector grew more rapidly in areas of India where
English is more widely spoken, and that in turn those areas experienced increased school enrolment. Kochar
(2004) showed that urban rates of return influence rural schooling, particularly amongst households who are
most likely to seek urban employment.
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When focusing on a similarly-constructed sample, effects for young women are comparable
in magnitude to earlier, geographically-focused work exploiting truly randomized exposure
to seat quotas. This supports broader generalizability of the effects among middle-school age
children to the entire country. Increasing the sample to all pre-university-age adolescents
highlights the presence of an enrollment response among young men of upper secondary age
groups. It is left for future work to determine the nature and cause of these potentially
dynamic responses to quota exposure among non-beneficiary groups.
Overall, these findings can further guide policymakers as to whether or not seat quotas
can reduce gender inequality in either school enrollment or educational attianment, and for
which age groups, and may better inform the degree to which such a policy can be expected
to have gender-specific, or broader, effects on human capital accumulation.

Age group
Panel A: Male
5–8
9 – 11
12 – 14
15 – 17
Panel B: Female
5–8
9 – 11
12 – 14
15 – 17
Panel C: Enrollment gap
5–8
9 – 11
12 – 14
15 – 17

1987

1993

non-SC/ST
1999 2004 2007

Change

1987

SC/ST
1993 1999 2004

0.98
0.91
0.78
0.5

0.99
0.94
0.85
0.55

0.99
0.97
0.88
0.61

1
0.99
0.91
0.63

0.99
0.98
0.93
0.69

0.01
0.07
0.15
0.19

0.96
0.83
0.65
0.39

0.98
0.89
0.73
0.41

0.99
0.94
0.79
0.48

0.99
0.98
0.87
0.51

0.99
0.97
0.88
0.55

.03
.14
.23
.17

0.96
0.77
0.5
0.22

0.98
0.84
0.62
0.31

0.99
0.93
0.73
0.42

1
0.96
0.79
0.48

0.99
0.96
0.83
0.55

0.03
0.19
0.33
0.33

0.94
0.6
0.32
0.12

0.94
0.73
0.43
0.19

0.98
0.86
0.6
0.3

0.99
0.93
0.71
0.37

0.97
0.93
0.78
0.45

.03
.33
.46
.33

-0.02 -0.02
0
0
0
-0.14 -0.11 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02
-0.28 -0.23 -0.15 -0.12 -0.1
-0.29 -0.24 -0.19 -0.15 -0.14

0.02
0.12
0.18
0.15

-0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
-0.23 -0.16 -0.09 -0.05 -0.04
-0.33 -0.3 -0.19 -0.16 -0.1
-0.27 -0.22 -0.19 -0.14 -0.1

.01
.19
.23
.16

2007

Change

Note: Author’s calculations using data from the National Sample Survey Organisation, Schedule 10: Employment/Unemployment (various rounds). Enrollment rates are calculated as the mean across individuals of an indicator
for usual principal activity reported as “attending an educational institution” for the age groups specified. Population
estimates are constructed by weighting by the inverse sampling probability (sample weights) provided with the data.
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Table 1.2: Testing for differential trends in pre-policy enrollment rates
Dependent variable: individual enrollment [0/1]
women
men
non-SC/ST
SC/ST
non-SC/ST
SC/ST
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.01756*** 0.01099*** 0.02046***
0.00963***
(0.00213)
(0.00174)
(0.00254)
(0.00202)

Sample:

Year
Year*73rd CAA implementation year
N
adj. R2

0.00071
(0.00053)

0.00016
(0.00028)

0.00009
(0.00066)

0.00107**
(0.00044)

65961
0.107

22531
0.040

78718
0.146

27805
0.049

Note: Table presents a test of differential pre-period trends estimated via a linear probability
model regressing individual-level enrollment status of 9 to 17 year-olds in rural areas across
three pre-intervention survey waves on a linear time trend and the time trend interacted with
the state-level policy implementation year. Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors
clustered by state reported in parentheses. All specifications include an unreported constant
term and vectors of state fixed effects. Estimations are weighted by the provided sampling
weight. Significance indicated by: ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01.

Table 1.3: Summary statistics, cross-border estimation sample
Variable
Enrollment rate, 2007
non-SC/ST, female
non-SC/ST, male
SC/ST, female
SC/ST, male
Enrollment rate, 1987
non-SC/ST, female
non-SC/ST, male
SC/ST, female
SC/ST, male
Years Exposure to 73rd Amendment, 2007
Combined population of district pair, 1987

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

N

0.8
0.89
0.74
0.8

0.13
0.09
0.21
0.14

0.41
0.56
0.05
0.29

1
1
1
1

178
178
177
177

0.45
0.72
0.29
0.61
10.73
267212.5

0.2
0.15
0.22
0.21
2.67
177386

0
0
0
0
2
5652

0.96
1
1
1
14
1013896

174
174
172
173
178
174

Note: Table shows summary statistics for districts lying on state borders. District-level
enrollment rates calculated as the count of individuals reporting usual principal activity
as “attending an educational institution” divided by the total population for the sample
of 9 to 17 year-olds in rural areas using sample weights. Sample counts differ across
measures due to missing values.

SC/ST population share
Sex ratio

Dependent variable: cumulative policy exposure
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
2.248
(1.768)
8.500

(5)

(6)

(7.622)
Rural population share

(9.961)
-0.738

1.498
(1.526)

Female middle school completion rate

(2.238)
2.247

-4.072
(6.837)

DPEP Phase 1 district
DPEP expansion district

0.817

(6.903)
0.882

(0.661)
0.301

(0.731)
0.441

(0.919)

(0.803)
-0.095

Years of Congress-party rule

-0.095
(0.114)

F-statistic, joint hypotheses test
N
adj. R2

178
0.546

178
0.521

178
0.518

(7)
2.124
(1.788)
10.109

178
0.518

0.76
178
0.524

178
0.524

(0.112)
1.04
178
0.565

Note: Table presents a falsification test predicting eventual policy exposure with pre-policy area characteristics. Estimates via
OLS. Sample comprised of 178 covariate-matched border districts as described in text. All specifications include an unreported
constant term and district pair fixed effects. Significance indicated by: ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01.
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Table 1.4: District border sample: balance
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Table 1.5: Estimation of school enrollment rates: non SC/ST
Specification:

Panel A: non-SC/ST women
Exposure, 2007 (years)

Dependent variable: district enrollment rate
Base
Incl. 1987
Incl. policy
Policy controls
control
controls
* covariates
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.008**
(0.004)

0.007*
(0.004)

N
0.412

Y
0.416

0.006**
(0.003)

0.006*
(0.003)

N
0.358

Y
0.356

Mean outcome
Std. Dev. Outcome
N
Pre-policy control
adj. R2
Panel B: non-SC/ST men
Exposure, 2007 (years)
Mean outcome
Std. Dev. Outcome
N
Pre-policy control
adj. R2

0.008**
(0.003)
0.803
0.126
178
Y
0.429
0.006**
(0.003)
0.889
0.089
178
Y
0.352

0.007*
(0.003)

Y
0.448
0.006*
(0.003)

Y
0.346

Note: Table presents coefficients from an unweighted linear regression of the district enrollment
rate in 2007 on the 2007 cumulative policy exposure. Underlying sample is comprised of 9-17
year-olds in rural areas in districts on state borders. Enrollment rates are calculated using
sample weights. Pre-policy control is defined as the enrollment rate for the focal group in the
district in 1987. “Concurrent policy controls” include years exposure to DPEP program and
progressive party rule. Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors clustered by state
reported in parentheses. All specifications include an unreported constant term and district
pair fixed effects. Significance indicated by: ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01.
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Table 1.6: Estimation of school enrollment rates: SC/ST
Specification:

Panel A: SC/ST women
Exposure, 2007 (years)
Mean outcome
Std. Dev. Outcome
N
Pre-policy control
adj. R2
Panel B: SC/ST men
Exposure, 2007 (years)
Mean outcome
Std. Dev. Outcome
N
Pre-policy control
adj. R2

Dependent variable: district enrollment rate
Base
Incl. 1987
Incl. policy
Policy controls
control
controls
* covariates
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.043***
(0.010)

0.045***
(0.010)

N
0.338

Y
0.351

0.022*
(0.012)

0.025**
(0.011)

N
0.313

Y
0.307

0.046***
(0.010)
0.737
0.211
178
Y
0.334

0.041***
(0.011)

0.025**
(0.010)
0.801
0.143
178
Y
0.363

0.021**
(0.008)

Y
0.346

Y
0.369

Note: Table presents coefficients from an unweighted linear regression of the district
enrollment rate in 2007 on the 2007 cumulative policy exposure. Underlying sample is
comprised of 9-17 year-olds in rural areas in districts on state borders. Enrollment rates
are calculated using sample weights. Pre-policy control is defined as the enrollment rate
for the focal group in the district in 1987. “Concurrent policy controls” include years
exposure to DPEP program and progressive party rule. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
robust standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All specifications
include an unreported constant term and district pair fixed effects. Significance indicated
by: ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01.

Covariate-matched sample
Coefficient distribution
(Tables 5 & 6)
500 matched samples
Point estimate 95% confidence interval Median point estimate 95% empirical confidence interval
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
non-SC/ST women
0.008**
[0.0002, 0.0151]
0.0064611
[0.0008, 0.0128]
non-SC/ST men
0.006**
[0.0005, 0.0114]
0.0023815
[-0.0032, 0.0082]
SC/ST women
0.043***
[0.0221, 0.0645]
0.0422824
[0.0073, 0.0892]
SC/ST men
0.022*
[-0.0034, 0.0474]
0.0288732
[-0.0056, 0.0520]

Note: Columns 1 and 2 above reproduce coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from column 2 of Tables 5 and
6. Columns 3 and 4 present the median point estimate from the empirical coefficient distribution across 500 border
district matchings and the corresponding empirical 95% confidence interval. Significance of point estimates reproduced
in column 1 indicated by: ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01.
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cross-state border district variation
Dependent variable: district mean share of 9-17 year-olds engaged in activity
In labor
LF: Work in
LF: Paid
LF: Looking
Household
force
home enterprise
wage work
for work
duties
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Panel A: non-SC/ST women
Exposure, 2007 (years)
Mean outcome
Std. Dev. Outcome
Pre-policy control
N
adj. R2
Panel B: non-SC/ST men
Exposure, 2007 (years)
Mean outcome
Std. Dev. Outcome
Pre-policy control
N
adj. R2

-0.0027
(0.0018)
0.051

-0.0032*
(0.0016)
0.046

0.0006*
(0.0004)
0.002

-0.0014*
(0.0008)
0.016

-0.0046
(0.0033)
0.146

0.073
Y
178
0.400

0.070
Y
178
0.417

0.012
Y
178
0.140

0.035
Y
178
0.065

0.119
Y
178
0.409

-0.0063***
(0.0021)
0.102

-0.0050**
(0.0021)
0.084

-0.0006**
(0.0003)
0.007

-0.0008
(0.0012)
0.026

0
0.0003
(0.0005)
0.009

0.085
Y
178
0.265

0.080
Y
178
0.359

0.017
Y
178
0.117

0.040
Y
178
0.055

0.022
Y
178
0.469

Note: Table presents coefficients from an unweighted linear regression of the 2007 share of school-age children of the focal
sample engaging in the activity indicated by column headers on the 2007 policy exposure measure among neighboring districts
lying across state borders. All measures calculated using sample weights. “LF” indicates traditionally-defined labor force
activities. Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All specifications
include an unreported constant term, district pair fixed effects, and a district-level pre-policy control measure. Significance
indicated by: ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01.
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cross-state border district variation
Dependent variable: district mean share of 9-17 year-olds engaged in activity
In labor
LF: Work in
LF: Paid
LF: Looking
Household
force
home enterprise
wage work
for work
duties
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Panel A: SC/ST women
Exposure, 2007 (years)
Mean outcome
Std. Dev. Outcome
Pre-policy control
N
adj. R2
Panel B: SC/ST men
Exposure, 2007 (years)
Mean outcome
Std. Dev. Outcome
Pre-policy control
N
adj. R2

-0.0041
(0.0045)
0.073

-0.0017
(0.0043)
0.070

-0.0015
(0.0011)
0.002

-0.0002
(0.0019)
0.020

-0.0379***
(0.0077)
0.190

0.101
Y
177
0.237

0.100
Y
177
0.230

0.016
Y
177
0.169

0.045
Y
177
0.151

0.183
Y
177
0.244

-0.0156**
(0.0071)
0.172

-0.0060
(0.0068)
0.144

-0.0031
(0.0022)
0.010

-0.0114**
(0.0046)
0.047

-0.0112***
(0.0022)
0.027

0.132
Y
177
0.213

0.132
Y
177
0.226

0.037
Y
177
-0.232

0.062
Y
177
0.005

0.064
Y
177
0.471

Note: Table presents coefficients from an unweighted linear regression of the 2007 share of school-age children of the focal
sample engaging in the activity indicated by column headers on the 2007 policy exposure measure among neighboring districts
lying across state borders. All measures calculated using sample weights. “LF” indicates traditionally-defined labor force
activities. Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All specifications
include an unreported constant term, district pair fixed effects, and a district-level pre-policy control measure. Significance
indicated by: ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01.
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Panel A: non-SC/ST women
Exposure, 2007 (years)
adj. R2
N
Panel B: non-SC/ST men
Exposure, 2007 (years)
adj. R2
N
Panel C: SC/ST women
Exposure, 2007 (years)
adj. R2
N
Panel D: SC/ST men
Exposure, 2007 (years)
adj. R2
N

9 to 11
(1)

Dependent variable: district enrollment rate
Age
Income tercile
Highest F. educ. Level
12 to 14 15 to 17
1st
2nd
3rd
Illiteracy
Literacy
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

-0.002
(0.003)
0.173

0.010
(0.007)
0.329

0.003
(0.008)
0.350

0.013**
(0.005)
0.377

0.016
(0.010)
0.119

0.009
(0.007)
0.225

0.007**
(0.003)
0.259

-0.002
(0.004)
0.035

177

176

174

150

170

173

174

172

-0.001
(0.001)
0.101

-0.004
(0.004)
0.240

0.018***
(0.006)
0.325

0.007*
(0.003)
0.095

0.008
(0.007)
0.072

-0.002
(0.009)
0.050

0.005
(0.003)
0.212

-0.001
(0.003)
0.120

177

176

174

150

170

173

174

172

0.021
(0.013)
0.027

0.037**
(0.014)
0.314

0.101***
(0.016)
0.389

0.058**
(0.023)
0.096

0.019
(0.032)
0.077

0.074
(0.046)
0.159

0.042***
(0.011)
0.310

-0.028
(0.024)
0.417

174

167

167

141

157

142

173

133

0.007**
(0.003)
0.151

0.031**
(0.014)
0.172

0.027
(0.030)
0.170

0.018
(0.019)
0.104

0.007
(0.024)
0.058

0.138***
(0.028)
0.408

0.019*
(0.011)
0.307

0.043
(0.034)
0.022

174

171

167

142

164

159

173

137

Note: Table presents coefficients from an unweighted linear regression of the district enrollment rate in 2007 on the 2007 policy
exposure measure among neighboring districts lying across state borders. Underlying sample indicated by panel and column
titles. Enrollment rates are calculated using sample weights. Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors clustered
by state reported in parentheses. All specifications include an unreported constant term, district pair fixed effects, and a
district-level pre-policy control measure. Significance indicated by: ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01.
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Dependent variable: district schooling infrastructure indicator
Schools per Schools per New schools per Share classrooms Teachers Share schools w/ Share teachers
person
person (rural)
thousand
“good” condition per pupil girls’ lavatory
female
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Exposure, 2007 (years) -0.00001
-0.00003
-0.00001
0.00728
0.01960
-0.00017
-0.00756
(0.00004)
(0.00004)
(0.00003)
(0.00806)
(0.01539)
(0.00031)
(0.00734)
N
176
176
176
177
177
177
177
adj. R2

0.435

0.500

0.347

0.512

0.404

0.480

0.588

Note: Notes: Table presents coefficients from an unweighted linear regression of the district schooling infrastructure measure
(indicated by column) in 2007 on the 2007 policy exposure measure among neighboring districts lying across state borders.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All specifications include an
unreported constant term, district pair fixed effects, and a district-level pre-policy control measure. Significance indicated by:
∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01.
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Labor force
participation
(1)
Panel A: non-SC/ST women
Exposure, 2007 (years)
N
adj. R2
Panel B: SC/ST women
Exposure, 2007 (years)
N
adj. R2

Dependent variable: standardized district indicator mean
share
number of
age at
husband’s
husb. ed*
married
children
first birth
ed. (years)
*own ed.
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

husband’s
wage
(7)

0.024
(0.033)
178

-0.045
(0.042)
163

0.015
(0.034)
163

-0.114**
(0.041)
163

0.033
(0.045)
163

0.004
(0.039)
163

0.002
(0.030)
162

0.352

0.038

0.084

-0.058

0.289

0.378

0.217

0.004
(0.045)
177

-0.056
(0.055)
174

0.010
(0.032)
174

-0.116***
(0.033)
173

-0.064
(0.039)
174

-0.051
(0.059)
174

0.030**
(0.011)
173

0.118

0.147

0.331

-0.199

0.351

0.168

0.421

Note: Table presents coefficients from an unweighted linear regression of the unit-standardized 2007 district-level mean of
the measure indicated by column headers on the 2007 policy exposure measure among neighboring districts lying across state
borders. Underlying sample is comprised of 25-35 year-old women in rural areas. Measures calculated using sample weights.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All specifications include an
unreported constant term, district pair fixed effects, and a district-level pre-policy control measure. Significance indicated by:
∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01.
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Table 1.12: Cumulative effect of quota exposure on alternative outcomes
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36

Notes: Figures depict pre-policy enrollment rate for the focal group relative to
eventual policy implementation year. Source: Author’s calculations based on
GOI (2008) and data from NSS Schedule 10, 1987-88.
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Figure 1.1: Pre-policy enrollment rates, by group
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Notes: Figure depicts coefficient estimates with 90% confidence interval from event study specification
as described in Section III.
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Figure 1.2: Event study estimates, by group
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Appendix Table A1: Comparison of state border and interior district enrollment rates

Panel A: 1987
enrollment, non-SC/ST female
enrollment, non-SC/ST male
enrollment, SC/ST female
enrollment, SC/ST male
Female population share
SC/ST population share
Panel B: 2007
non-SC/ST, female
non-SC/ST, male
SC/ST, female
SC/ST, male
Female population share
SC/ST population share

Interior

State border

0.468
0.737
0.335
0.647
0.445
0.220

0.477
0.722
0.333
0.625
0.438
0.319

0.787
0.876
0.768
0.813
0.466
0.272

0.815
0.882
0.760
0.824
0.465
0.370

Border - Interior

p-value

N

0.009
-0.015
-0.002
-0.022
-0.007
0.099***

0.71
0.37
0.95
0.36
0.30
0.00

374
374
368
368
374
374

0.028*
0.006
-0.008
0.011
-0.000
0.099***

0.06
0.63
0.71
0.50
0.95
0.00

384
384
376
376
384
384

Note: Table shows test of observable differences across border and interior districts in
1987 and 2007. Statistical significance tested using two-sample t-tests assuming equal
variances. Significance levels are indicated by ∗ < .10, ∗∗ < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗ < .01.
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Appendix Table A2: Effect sizes across age samples
Dependent variable: district enrollment rate
Sample:
Women
Men
(1)
(2)
Panel A: Pooled sample
Exposure, 2007 (years)
0.01390*** 0.00854***
(0.00442)
(0.00212)
Panel B: 9-10 year-olds
Exposure, 2007 (years)
0.00107
-0.00035
(0.00402)
(0.00127)
Panel B: 11-15 year-olds
Exposure, 2007 (years)
0.01835***
0.00327
(0.00613)
(0.00231)
Panel B: 16-17 year-olds
Exposure, 2007 (years)
0.00357
0.03163***
(0.01599)
(0.00889)
Note: Table presents pooled-sample coefficients from an unweighted linear regression
of the district enrollment rate in 2007 on the 2007 cumulative policy exposure. Panel
A estimates the net enrollment rate for entire 9-17 year-old age sample. Panels B, C
and D estimate enrollment rates for the indicated age group. The underlying sample
is comprised of children in rural areas and enrollment rates are calculated using sample
weights. Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors clustered by state reported
in parentheses. All specifications include an unreported constant term, the enrollment
rate for the focal group in the district in 1987, district pair fixed effects, an indicator
for SC/ST status, the rural SC/ST population share, the rural SC/ST population share
interacted with SC/ST status, and this measure interacted with policy exposure. Significance indicated by: ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01.

Chapter 2
Quota policies and upward mobility
I

2.1

Introduction

Increasing the economic and social participation of historically-underrepresented groups is
a popular policy goal. Quotas are a common tool to achieve these goals, and are applied
to various spheres such as education, business and politics.1 Ideally, these policies render
themselves obsolete over time by changing aspects of the environment in which they operate
that originally gave rise to the targeted disparities in participation. Whether institutional
change is possible has long been debated in the many contexts in which such policies have
been proposed or advocated (Coate and Loury, 1993).
Typically due to institutional or political factors, quotas are most often targeted at a
specific level of a broader structure, rather than uniformly in an entire system or organization.
In governance, quotas are commonly applied to national legislatures, but not in sub-national
governance, or vice versa. Among firms, quotas can be seen applied to various strata but
1

In a common incarnation of such efforts, more than 90 countries have mandated seat or candidate quotas
in elected bodies as of 2015 (The Quota Project, 2015).
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rarely throughout the entire organization, as in the case of corporate board quotas in Norway
or Germany. In education, for example, quotas are often found at the tertiary level, as in
Indian and Brazilian public universities. Often implicit is the argument that the application
of quotas to one environment can affect representation in related areas over time. The
question motivating this paper is: how do quotas applied to a specific strata of an organization
or structure affect participation and representation in adjacent levels of the same structure
that are not subject to quotas? To answer this, I use the Indian experience with quotas
for women in local politics to investigate effects on both participation and representation of
women in higher levels of government, where quotas do not exist.
There are several technical challenges to answering this question which jointly motivate
the use of the Indian experience with quotas in politics as an ideal environment to study
longer-term effects across strata of the governance hierarchy. The first is that effects in
adjacent environments are likely to appear only after some time due to the nature of occupational experience that is a first-order channel through which such policies can affect later
participation; this requires the ability to observe a policy and participation over a substantial
period in order to detect long-term effects. Second, and in view of the common applications
of quotas to the private sector, a substantial difficulty is that dynamics of competition and
upward mobility are often difficult to observe without extensive or proprietary data sources
(requiring longitudinal employee-employer data, in the case of the private sector); even when
such data sources are available, however, the outcomes available (e.g., promotion) may only
provide a partial picture of the dynamics within the organization given that failed (promotion) contests are rarely directly observable. The public nature of election records overcomes
these initial typical limitations. Finally, such records are rarely maintained in a manner
that allows viable observation of individual candidates over time and at different levels of
government, making individual-level panel data on repeat candidacies by politicians practically non-existent – especially for developing countries. By constructing such a dataset
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and perfectly observing exogenous geographic exposure to seat quotas in local government
over a period of up to 15 years, the Indian experience in politics provides an opportunity to
overcome typical obstacles in approaching these questions empirically.
Using randomly-assigned variation in exposure to women leaders across constituencies, I
show that longer exposure to seat quotas in local leadership roles increases female political
candidacy in higher office among state and national legislatures – where quotas do not
exist. State legislature constituencies that experienced ten additional years of exposure
to women leaders in place through the quota policy fielded .15 more female candidates
than constituencies with zero exposure; parliamentary constituencies fielded .41 more female
candidates. The magnitude of these effects is substantive, as they imply that the local
quota policy was responsible for around 50 percent of the increase in the number of female
candidates running for office in higher levels of government since the policy began. There
was no effect on female candidates winning elections, however. These findings are robust
across various specifications and alternative estimators, and effects are not correlated with
heterogeneity in constituency characteristics.
I then investigate hypotheses related to the reasons why these higher levels of government
saw increased candidacy. By observing political career histories of candidates, I find the
policy effect is driven by two mutually exclusive groups of candidates. Approximately half
of the increase in female parliamentary candidates is due to candidates who had previously
contested a state assembly election and continued contesting for higher office in areas that
received longer quota exposure. Another portion of the candidacy response is attributable to
politicians who gained direct experience from the quota system, having previously served in
local government. Together, these findings suggest a combination of direct effects via cohorts
of female politicians who contest elections at higher levels of government after gaining specific
political experience provided them by the quota system, and indirect effects making certain
areas more conducive to female candidacy. While prior studies, notably Beaman et al. (2009),
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have established that voter attitudes change after exposure to women leaders, this paper is
the first to provide evidence of a response among potential candidates to voters’ exposure.
Overall, this is the first paper to show specific supply-side effects of quotas on later, higher
level candidacy alongside suggestive evidence of a response among potential candidates to
changed voter demand.
Finally, I investigate potential reasons why there is no demonstrated effect on these
female candidates winning the elections they contest. Overall, female candidates perform
approximately as well as the median candidate in the elections they contest. I also find
that most of the new candidates run as independents, rather then as part of major or minor
parties, suggesting a potential lack of access to resources for campaigns at higher levels of
government. Finally, I show no effects among voter turnout, disqualifying the hypothesis
that candidacy increases arise indirectly due to increased (female) voter mobilization by local
female politicians.
This paper is among the first to quantify the degree to which quotas at a lower strata
of an organizational hierarchy can affect dynamics at higher levels of the same structure. In
India, a one-third quota policy for women in local politics has increased the substantive representation of women in local government, and several studies have shown this quota system
to have beneficial effects on constituents beyond those changes directly linked to governance.2
The relative success of these quotas for women in local government, however, has not yet
translated into an increase in representation by women in higher levels of government, where
quotas do not exist: the share of female parliamentarians in the directly-elected lower house
of parliament has remained around ten percent since the mid-1980s, and there is a similar
stability in these figures among state legislatures. Overall, little is known about whether the
quotas affect the broader dynamics of the political system in which they operate, and if so,
2

These effects include, for example, public goods provision (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004a) as well as
longer-run investments attributable to changes in aspirations (Beaman et al., 2012b).
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whether such changes are temporary or persistent in nature.
I contribute to the literature in a number of areas. This paper is most directly related to
earlier studies on quotas in politics in developing countries, a number of which have investigated the Indian experience with seat reservations in politics and their varied effects among
both government and constituents. These studies primarily assess immediate effects on policy outcomes or changes outside the political system: Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004a) find
differences in public good provision, while Beaman et al. (2012b) find investments among
young women attributable to changes in aspirations. Jensenius (2015), however, finds no
effect of caste-based reservations on development outcomes in India over a period of 30 years
that these quotas were active. In terms of institutional change, Iyer et al. (2012b) find evidence that political empowerment resulted in greater reporting of crimes against women, and
Brollo and Troiano (2015) find evidence of reduced political patronage by women mayors in
Brazil which ultimately affects their reelection probabilities (negatively). On the ability of
leaders to change attitudes and perceptions, Beaman et al. (2009) show how perceptions of
women improve once men are exposed to women in leadership roles, providing substantial
evidence in support of the model of attitudes and bias in Hoff and Stiglitz (2010). Conceptually similar to this body of work, I also look at effects of quotas outside the particular
environment to which they are applied; in contrast, however, I investigate effects in other
areas of the political system rather than outside politics.
This investigation of the effects of exposure to women leaders in politics on future candidacy is also related to earlier work that investigates legacy effects of female political participation on voters and candidates. While distinct legacy effects have been found in a number of
contexts for local politics, evidence is mixed at higher levels of government.3 Bhalotra et al.
(2015) find positive effects of a woman winning an election on subsequent female candidacy
3
Studies of the legacy effects of female politicians on future candidacies in local politics include Nagarajan
et al. (2011) for India, and Gilardi (2014) for Switzerland.
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in state legislatures in India (primarily driven by the same candidates contesting again),
while Broockman (2014) finds no effect among U.S. state legislature elections. Perhaps most
closely related is Bhavnani (2009), who uses randomly assigned municipal council elections
to determine the effects of seat reservation in municipal government in India on later candidacy in the same municipal councils to find that quotas served to introduce women into
politics who would later run, and to demonstrate more broadly that women could be viable
candidates. In the current work, I complement this literature by investigating effects of
female politicians across levels of government, rather than within the same legislative body.
The paper is also closely related to empirical investigations of the effect of affirmative
action and quotas in the commercial sector, notably Coate and Loury (1993) and, more
recently, Bertrand et al. (2014). Bertrand et al. (2014) study an instance of the European
experience with gender quotas in Norway and find that a mandated change in the gender
composition of the upper echelons of firm governance yielded no effects on women outside
these few positions in the same firm. As mentioned before, the current study evaluates the
effect of quotas which plausibly operate in the opposite direction through the creation of a
supply of experienced female candidates. Finally, the paper is related to studies on gender
differences in risk, competition, and tournament entry. A detailed and recent review of this
literature can be found in Niederle (2014).

2.2

History of seat quotas in local government

Seat quotas for women in government were introduced in India at the national level with
the 73rd Amendment to the Indian Constitution. These pieces of legislation, passed in 1992,
gave national support to the formalization and implementation of an historical, decentralized
governance structure known as the panchayat. The 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act instituted a three-tiered system of local government within states, consisting of the village,
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sub-district (block), and district levels across rural areas of the country. The Amendments
were intended to provide large-scale devolution and decentralization of powers to the local bodies, stipulated that members of the local governance bodies were to be elected at
five-year intervals, and provided for one-third of all seats at each governance level to be
filled by women and a proportionate seat share reserved for representatives from historically
marginalized social groups. These policies and their implementation has been the focus of a
number of studies to date; further details can be found in Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004a),
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004b), and Iyer et al. (2012b).
There are a few particularly salient aspects of the policy implementation worth discussing.
The first is that the 73rd Amendment stipulated that states had the responsibility to adjust or
amend local elections to comply with the provisions of the Amendments. All states amended
existing laws or passed new laws to incorporate provisions of the amendment, and compliant
elections were eventually held in nearly all jurisdictions. However, and as first pointed out
by Iyer et al. (2012b), there is considerable variation in the timing of these first elections
across states. Second, the quota policy was applicable only to local governance, importantly
excluding state and national legislatures from having quotas for women. Finally, once the
provisions of the reform were implemented, one third of seats were reserved for women at any
level of the local governance hierarchy; for single-seat leadership positions, reservations were
assigned randomly across areas in each election cycle such that in aggregate, the one-third
quota would be met. This feature of rotating leadership assignment has been used to assess
the effects of women leaders in previous studies, including Beaman et al. (2012b) and Iyer
et al. (2012b), among others. After several election cycles with the random assignment, there
is considerable variation across areas in the cumulative number of years exposed to a woman
in the leadership position; it is this variation in cumulative exposure to quotas applied to
district leadership seats – at the highest level of this governance structure – that provides
exogenous cross-sectional variation in exposure to women leaders used to identify dynamic

CHAPTER 2. QUOTA POLICIES AND UPWARD MOBILITY

47

cross-level effects in the political hierarchy.

2.3

Channels for quotas to affect candidacy

There are two channels by which exposure to quotas might increase candidacy of women.
A direct, supply-side channel provides a cohort of particular women experience in the political arena in local government, and some portion of these same women continue in a
political career by contesting for higher office. The single district-level leadership seats are
particularly germane to focus on as potential conduits for individual politicians to translate
experience into candidacy for higher office: the district constituencies served by the chairperson consisted of areas (populations) that are larger than state assembly constituencies
and, on average, of a similar size to parliamentary constituencies. The power accorded these
leadership positions is thus substantial, relative to those at lower levels of the local government, and has the potential to accord both experience and exposure to the public at a level
necessary for politicians to consider candidacy at higher levels of government.
The other channel, evidence for which has been established by the work of Beaman et al.
(2009) and Bhavnani (2009) in similar contexts, suggests a demand-side mechanism in which
constituents’ exposure to women leaders changes voter attitudes and thus the viability of
female candidates contesting elections in those constituencies. I augment typical elections
records by constructing a longitudinal candidate panel dataset that allows the observation of
candidacies by the same individual over time in order to disentangle these channels. Support
for the candidate supply channel would be evidenced by the net policy effect being traced
to individuals who served in local government due to quotas. While direct evidence for the
demand-side effect would require voter data, response to changes in voter attitudes may
be evidenced by candidacy response among women who were not previously involved in
local government. In the analysis to follow, I show that both are present and contribute
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approximately equally to the net candidacy response to quota exposure.

2.4
2.4.1

Data
Exposure to female leaders

Measures of exposure to seat quotas over time is available from Iyer et al. (2012b), who
digitized archival data from various sources for ten states’ full history of district-level seat
reservations since implementation of the 73rd Amendment.4 Using these data, Figure 1
shows the variation in cumulative exposure to district chairperson reservations as of 2007
for the states where this information is available, with those districts receiving more (less)
exposure to women leaders more (less) heavily shaded.
Table 1 contains summary statistics of the cross-district variation in cumulative exposure
to district chairperson reservations as of 2007 by state (as shown in Figure 1). The mean level
of exposure across states is relatively similar, but there is substantial within-state variation
in years of exposure, reflecting the nature of the chairperson reservation assignments. Note,
however, that some states (for example, Haryana and Rajasthan) have little variation in
exposure across districts while other states (Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, and West Bengal, for
example) have exposure ranging from zero to 10 or 11 years.
Figure 2 depicts this same variation across states and districts. In this figure, each
position on the vertical axis represents a separate district, with districts in the same states
grouped together. For each district, the appearance of a filled line indicates that the district
chairperson seat was reserved for a woman in that year (indicated on the horizontal axis).
Districts that did not receive any period of reservation are indicated in grey within each state
4

Comprehensive information on seat reservations is not readily accessible from any public sources or
records. For their study, the authors of Iyer et al. (2012b) collected data from diverse sources, including
filing Right to Information Act requests for the history of district leader reservation assignments since the
implementation of the 73rd Amendment. Some states did not respond to these requests, resulting in the
ten-state sample shown in Figure 1.
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series. A few important patterns are worth highlighting. First, assignment of chairperson
seat reservation is not perfectly rotated: at the end of each election cycle, some districts
continue being reserved while others switch status. Second, a number of districts received no
reservation at all; these are present in seven out of ten states. Third, Maharashtra followed
a three year election/reservation cycle, while all other states followed a five year cycle.
Additionally, there are two dimensions of exogenous variation arising after several election
cycles: in cumulative exposure and in relative recency of exposure. In the analysis that
follows, the variation in cumulative exposure will be used to identify net policy effects, while
variation in recency will be used to explore secondary hypothesis related to the mechanisms
by which quotas affect political participation.

2.4.2

Elections data

Digitized historical state assembly election data come from Jensenius (2013), and include vote
counts and basic candidate information for candidates contesting state legislature elections
through 2007. Due to elections being held in different years across states, the sample is
selected to the most recent election prior to and including calendar year 2007 for each state
for the state assembly analysis, and these records are then associated with cumulative policy
exposure as of the election year.5 Data from parliamentary elections comes from the Election
Commission of India and contains the details of all candidates across all constituencies of
the directly-elected lower house of parliament (the Lok Sabha). The candidate data for both
assemblies and parliament are reported with a number of fields, most importantly candidate
names, gender, vote shares, and constituency voter turnout.
The candidate lists provide the potential to observe candidacy by the same individual
across elections, which is used below to distinguish candidacy effects by candidates’ carrer
5

Appendix Table 1 shows the years in which the last assembly election was held prior to and including
2007.
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histories. Creating a viable candidate panel is not straightforward, however, due to the fact
there is no unique identifier field associated with candidates and a given individual’s name
may not be spelled or registered the same way across elections for any number of reasons
(including differences in transliteration, honorifics, or name abbreviations, among others). In
order to match candidates across elections, I apply an approximate string matching algorithm
which searches for each candidate name in a given state and election with potential name
matches in the following election cycle in the same state and with the same gender. Potential
matches are then selected among names that are within a given string distance and are
reviewed manually and a final match decision is made. Summary statistics can be found in
Appendix Table 3 and the Appendix contains a full description of this process.

2.4.3

Matching districts and political constituencies

Parliamentary and assembly constituencies comprise the focal units of analysis given that
elections are conducted according to political boundaries; district boundaries, which determine exposure to chairperson seat reservations, do not overlap with parliamentary or
assembly constituencies (see Appendix Figure 1). To calculate an accurate measure of a
constituency’s exposure to female district leaders, I use GIS software to identify the intersection of the two sets of geographic areas in order to assign the respective portions of each
district to its parliamentary constituency; this process then creates a set of unique geographic
areas defined by the area pertaining to a unique combination of a district and constituency;
summary statistics are presented in Appendix Tables 4 and 5.6 Table 2 provides summary
statistics for these parliamentary and state assembly geographies.
6

It is important to note that this intersection process results in the basic geographic units that are the
foundation of the empirical analysis. If districts are indexed by d and constituencies (either parliamentary
or assembly) by c, any given unit thus has a particular definition as the area that comprises the unique
intersection of district d and constituency c; the area defined by d, c, in isolation, does not correspond to any
existing administrative or political unit.
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Analysis
Identification

Causal identification hinges on the exogeneity of the reservations assignment such that for
the estimating equation

Ys,d,c = δ0 + δ1 [Exposured ] + γs + µs,d,c

(2.1)

where Ys,d,c is the outcome for state s in the unique area comprised of the overlapping
area of district d and constituency c, Exposured measures the cumulative number of years
that the district leadership seat was reserved for a woman as of 2007, and γ represents a
vector of state fixed effects, the residual is orthogonal to exposure, conditional on γ, i.e.,
cov(µs,d,c , Exposured |γs ) = 0.
Identifying variation arises from two aspects of the policy. First, some areas were reserved
multiple times over the span of study; second, some areas had not yet completed their
reserved term of office as of the focal assembly or parliamentary election simply because they
were assigned reservation in a later election cycle than other areas. The following section
provides evidence that this variation is not correlated with observable characteristics of
constituencies; that is, there is substantial evidence supporting the proper implementation of
the random assignment of the leadership seat reservations across constituencies and election
cycles.

2.5.2

Falsification tests for selection on observables

Figure 3 provides visual evidence of exogeneity in cumulative exposure to female leaders
in district chairperson seats by plotting an area’s eventual exposure level against its prepolicy degree of female political participation (measured as the share of female candidates in
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the election prior to the policy implementation). In the top panel, I show this relationship
for state assembly constituencies; the left-hand graph shows the unconditional relationship,
and the right-hand graph shows the relationship after removing state fixed effects (i.e., the
within-state variation shown in Figure 1 that will be used to identify effects in the empirical
strategy). The bottom panel follows a similar pattern for parliamentary elections; in both
cases, the flat line suggests no strong relationship between ultimate exposure and preexisting
differences in the local propensity for women to be involved in politics.
For the analysis that follows, I focus on the relationship between policy exposure and
constituency-level measures of female and male candidacy. To formalize the above falsification test, I collect a set of pre-policy measures of district socioeconomic characteristics from
various sources and use them to predict the election outcomes that are the focus of analysis;
this predicted outcome is then regressed on the policy measure to test whether this aggregate
of pre-policy local characteristics encapsulated in the predicted outcome can be explained
by later policy variation. These characteristics are taken from the 1991 population census,
India’s standard household labor force survey carried out by the National Sample Survey
Organization in 1987-88, and elections records for the 1991 general election. The indicators
include demographic characteristics (average household size, sex ratios, ethnic mix), school
enrollment rates, female literacy rates, household consumption per capita, and the same
pre-period measures of female political participation.
Table 3 presents these estimations. For both state and national legislatures, the policy
measure has trivial explanatory power for the predicted outcomes. Another test lending
support to exogeneity in the policy measure across area observables is a direct test of the
degree to which pre-policy area characteristics can predict the policy measure; in Appendix
Table 2, I show that an F -test of the vector of coefficients on the pre-policy area characteristics fails to reject the null hypothesis at any traditional level of significance. Taken
together, these tests suggest strong within-state balance in pre-policy demographic, social,
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and political characteristics across districts receiving different eventual exposure intensities.

2.5.3

Estimation

Because seat reservation is assigned randomly in each election cycle, cumulative exposure is
uncorrelated with confounding unobservables as shown in the previous section. The empirical
strategy is thus straightforward: I regress a set of focal metrics of political competition across
constituencies for the focal elections on the contemporary cumulative exposure to female
district leaders. Regressions are weighted by the population share in the constituency based
on data from the Gridded Population of the World (CIESIN, 2005). By construction, the
error term is correlated by district (due to the policy variation) and constituency (the units
for which elections outcomes are observable), so standard errors are thus two-way clustered
by district and constituency.
Table 4 shows point estimates for the number of female and male candidates when separately regressed on cumulative years of chairperson reservations for the set of most recent
state assembly elections across states prior to 2009 using both OLS and count data (Poisson) estimators. The first column of Table 4 shows that an additional year of women in
leadership positions increases the number of female candidates by a small, but statistically
distinguishable .015. That is, for a constituency that experienced two election cycles (ten
years) of reservations relative to a constituency receiving no exposure, the former would
expect to see .15 (or approximately .22 standard deviations) more female candidates. This
is not seen alongside an increase in the number of male candidates (column 2). The pattern
and significance of the OLS estimates are mirrored in count data models in columns 3 and
4 using a Poisson estimator.
Table 5 shows coefficients for the same measures based on parliamentary elections in
2009. Coefficient patterns are largely similar to effects among assembly elections, although
the candidacy effect is substantially larger: for an additional ten years of exposure to female
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district leaders there is an additional .41 female candidates (or approximately .4 standard
deviations). At the mean level of exposure, almost one in six districts fielded an additional
female candidate (0.041*3.4 = .14 additional female candidates per constituency). There is
again no evidence of a response among male candidates in either direction. In both tables,
Panel B shows that results are similar in pattern and magnitude when controlling for prepolicy factors, including female candidate shares and local demographic characteristics.
The directional correspondence in effects of exposure to women leaders across two levels of
government confirms that district leadership seats are a potentially pivotal role in according
experience that is sufficient to enhance the (possibly self-assessed) viability of a candidate
in other elected bodies. That the effect is stronger at the parliamentary level also suggests
that the state legislature is not a necessary intermediate step for career politicians from
reserved areas – potentially explained by comparability in constituency sizes across districts
and parliamentary constituencies relative to state assembly constituencies.
The estimated magnitudes of the policy effect are substantial in view of the total increase
in the number of female candidates for office in these elections. In the 1991 parliamentary
elections there were 157 female candidates, compared to 265 in the 2009 elections, for the
states in the sample. With an average of 3.4 years of exposure to the policy across 278
constituencies, the point estimate of .041 implies an additional 38.75 female candidates
as a result of the policy, comprising approximately 35 percent of the increase the female
candidacy in these states seen over this period. In state legislatures, the policy effect is
smaller in magnitude, but is similarly responsible for a large share of the increase in female
candidates: with an average exposure of 2.8 years across 1,615 constituencies, the point
estimate of .015 implies an additional 67.8 female candidates running for state legislatures
– the majority of the increase from 705 to 802 female assembly candidates in these states
from before the policy to the most recent election.
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Robustness and effect heterogeneity
Non-linearities and moderators

Table 6 interacts the exposure measure with various local socioeconomic characteristics to
explore whether the overall effects on candidacy are concentrated in areas with any particular
characteristics. Column 1 repeats the unconditional OLS specifications from Tables 4 and
5 in Panels A and B, respectively. Column 2 reports results from a specification including
the square of the exposure measure, while columns 3-6 interact the exposure measure with
rural female literacy rates and educational attainment, the population sex ratio, and the
population share of lower-caste groups. Overall the estimates of the main effect of exposure
are remarkably robust across these specifications, with the exception of the polynomial specification (column 2) in which effects are imprecisely estimated for parliamentary elections,
and the squared term becoming more prominent among the state assembly elections.

2.6.2

Sample construction and composition

An alternative to the current sample construction method would be to calculate the weighted
average policy exposure for each constituency based on the various district components
comprising the constituency. This also obviates the need for multi-way clustering of standard
errors. Appendix Table 7 shows these estimates for both the state assemby and parliamentary
elections, with results mirroring (or stronger) than those in Tables 4 and 5. Results are also
robust to weighting observations by constituency area share instead of population, as seen
in Appendix Table 8.
Two concerns remain regarding the sample construction. The first is technical, and arises
from the GIS intersection process used to find overlapping areas between districts and constituencies. In this process, even small deviations in shapefile polygon borders from a “true”
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common border between a district and a constituency will result in a large number of miniscule areas in the resulting intersected dataset; some of the areas will represent a true overlap,
while some will represent erroneous overlaps into adjacent areas. These latter cases naturally introduce classical measurement error, although in weighted regressions these areas are
less likely to be influential and their removal should have minimal or slighly positive effects
on coefficient magnitude. The second remaining concern is the use of multi-district constituencies at all. Appendix Figure 2 addresses both of these concerns by showing coefficient
magnitudes and t-statistics for area samples that begin by removing the small areas from the
sample comprising less then one percent of the overall constituency area and progressively
increasing that cutoff up to areas that comprise 80 percent or greater of total constituency
area, leaving a sample comprised of constituencies that cleanly overlap with a district that
comprises 80 percent or more of its area. This exercise makes two points: first, removal of
the smallest areas has the expected effect on coefficient magnitudes (a slight increase, if any),
and second, even when restricting to more cleanly overlapping district-constituency pairs,
coefficient magnitudes and significance are similar (if not greater) than in the full sample.

2.7
2.7.1

Causal channels for the candidacy effect
Prior exposure to politics

The results above suggest that exposure to female leaders via quotas at a lower level of the
political hierarchy increases the political candidacy decisions of women running for higher
office. To better understand the ways in which the policy affects the candidacy margin,
I investigate personal characteristics of the candidates who are revealed to be moved by
the policy. To do this, I first use the panel nature of the candidate dataset to incorporate
historical information on candidacy and public service to determine if the effects in Table 5
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are particularly concentrated among either repeat candidates or incumbents.
I segment candidates by various measures of prior political experience and exposure,
with the focal outcomes now defined as the number of female candidates who are also (a)
candidates with prior exposure in local government, (b) repeat (parliamentary) candidates,
(c) previous candidates for lower office, and (d) candidates with known family involvement
in politics (Labonne et al., 2015). Table 7 presents point estimates when estimating the
same crosssectional specification as above.
By observing candidates’ career histories, I show that the policy effect among female candidates for parliament is effected equally by two groups of women: those who had previously
served in local government (column 1), and those who had previously contested (but not
won) state assembly elections and continued in politics to contest parliamentary elections
(column 3). These two groups are almost entirely distinct (shown in Appendix Table 6).
This result is fundamental for a number of reasons. First, the effects found at higher levels
of the political organization come, at least partially, from individuals with repeat candidacies. Short-run effects arising through this channel are thus likely to be small, and this
highlights the need to examine these dynamics from a cumulative, longer-term perspective.
Second, these results show that the “bottom-up” quota policy affects other levels of the
organizational hierarchy at least in part thorough internal candidates, some of whom were
originally introduced into politics through quotas. This stands in particular contrast to the
lack of effects outside the upper echelons of corporate structures from the “top-down” quota
policies for women in several European companies (Bertrand et al., 2014). Finally, this is
evidence for both the candidate-supply mechanism (being the exact same individuals who
gained experience in local government now contesting) and candidate response to changes
in voter demand, where prior higher-office candidates continued contesting elections in areas
that had historically been exposed to women politicians in positions of particular power.
While changes in attitudes after exposure to women leaders has been noted previously (Bea-
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man et al., 2009), Table 7 provides novel evidence suggesting a response among potential
candidates – who were not direct beneficiaries of the quota policy themselves – to likely
changes in voter attitudes in constituencies with greater past exposure to women politicians.

2.8
2.8.1

Representation Effects
Winning, election finishes, and effects on electoral competition

Table 8 estimates changes in the share of votes garnered by female candidates and in the
(unconditional) probability of a woman winning the election or finishing either in the top five
finishers or in the top 30 percent of finishers. Column 1 includes the change in the share of
candidates that are female for comparison. While column 2 shows female candidates capture
at least a proportionate share of votes (although imprecisely estimated), column 3 shows
that there is no distinguishable increase in the probability of electing a female candidate
in either state or national legislatures. This is important to note in the context of the
findings of Bhalotra et al. (2015), who show that political experience causes an increase in
female candidacies through repeat candidates. In the present situation, the ultimate effects
of the quotas policy could be compounded with positive incumbency effects were the female
candidates who contested as a result of quotas also likely to win elections. This is not the
case, however, and provides one reason for the impermanence of cross-level effects of local
quotas.
Focusing only on whether women win elections may understate changes in the viability
of female candidates. To address this, I construct alternative measures of whether a female
candidate finished in either the top five candidates or in the top 30 percent of candidates (to
adjust for candidacy pool size). Columns 4 and 5 contain the results of these estimations
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and indicate there are not substantial effects on women candidates finishing in the top of the
distribution of finishers in the elections in which they compete – suggesting the additional
female candidates induced by the policy receive relatively low vote shares in the elections
they contest, or, at least, the additional candidates finish no better or worse than the average
candidate.
This investigation into individual finishes does not allow for indirect effects of additional
candidates on the election contest overall, given that marginal candidates may still cause
changes in voting behavior of particular blocs to which they are particularly connected. In
Table 9, I establish several facts about the complier population responding to policy exposure
via parliamentary candidacy. To do this, I segment candidates into whether they ran for office
as independents or as part of a major or minor party, and then look at the effect of policy
exposure on the share of votes won by major party candidates. This establishes important
points about the candidates that run for parliament in constituencies longer-exposed to
quotas: (a) they largely run as independents, rather than party candidates (columns 1-3),
and (b) policy exposure reduces the vote share going to major party candidates (column 4).7
These marginal candidates may indirectly affect political outcomes through independent
candidacies that disproportionately reduce the vote share going to major party candidates.
I next estimate the effect of quota exposure on the probability of a female candidate
winning conditional on the presence of different types of female candidates. That is, does
quota exposure have a stronger effect on the probability of a female candidate winning when
the candidate has been incorporated into a major party, for example? Table 10 presents
the estimation of the specifications in columns 3, 4, and 5 of Table 8 conditional on the
presence of a female candidate (Panel A), the presence of a major-party female candidate
(Panel B), the presence of a minor-party female candidate (Panel C), and the presence of
7
There were four major party candidates in a constituency, on average, suggesting the expected vote
share loss for major party candidates would be approximately ten percent of the magnitude in column 4.
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an independent female candidate (Panel D). Abstracting from selection concerns, a clear
pattern emerges across panels: conditional on candidacy, women who are incorporated into
major parties increase their chances of election when their constituency has previously had
greater exposure to to quotas, whereas this is the opposite for independent candidates. These
results parallel the findings among municipal elections of Bhavnani (2009) by showing that
the most likely conduit to achieve follow-on representation effects for women after a quota
regime is through the concurrent incorporation of female candidates into major parties.
Finally, I interact the exposure measure with an indicator for the presence of an incumbent running in the election. If the lack of overall effects on representation was driven by the
presence of strong incumbents, we might expect to see female candidates winning at higher
rates in areas without a contesting incumbent compared to areas in which an incumbent is
contesting. The presence of an incumbent, however, may drive selection of different types of
female candidates in constitutencies in which an incumbent is running compared to those for
which this is not the case. To check for this selection effect, the first two columns of Table
11 estimate effects on the number of female candidates, with the incumbency indicator used
defined as any incumbent present (Column 1) or a major party incumbent present (Column
2). The negative effect on the main incumbency indicator in Columns 1 and 2 suggests
substantive negative effects of the presence of an incumbent on the presence of female candidates. The effects in Columns 3 and 4 on whether a female candidate wins an election may
then be driven by selection: incumbents generally discourage female candidacy, and those
women who do contest an election with an incumbent running may be particularly strong
candidates. The presence of an incumbent is not meaningfully related to policy exposure, so
it is likely the selection mainly occurs among female candidates limiting the conclusions that
can be drawn about whether incumbents themselves are the cause of a lack of representation
effects.

CHAPTER 2. QUOTA POLICIES AND UPWARD MOBILITY

2.8.2

61

Separating effects of recent versus past exposure

I next separate variation in the main exposure measure into periods of recency relative to
the focal election. If the effect of women leaders on candidacy were through some measure
of salience or inspiration (either directly, or through expectations of immediately-enhanced
voter support or turnout), we might expect to see effect sizes increasing in recency; if the primary channel by which candidacy is affected is through providing opportunities for political
experience, effect sizes may be less tied to particularly recent experience.
For this analysis, the policy measure is separated into three periods of exposure recency
relative to the focal election: exposure in the preceding four years, exposure five to nine years
prior, and early exposure in the first four years of the policy. These cutoffs are created in order
to capture the fact that terms of office are five years long; this ensures, for example, that an
area experiencing reservation five to nine years prior would necessarily have had a completed
term of office for those in reserved seats as of the time of the focal election. Estimates
for state assembly elections are in columns 1 and 2 of Table 12; effects in parliamentary
elections can be found in columns 3 and 4. Across both levels of government, it is clear
that the main results from Tables 4 and 5 are largely driven by exposure in the moderate
past, in which the particular leaders who would have been in the chairperson seat would
have had time to complete their full term of office and used that experience to establish
a foundation for, or begin, their next political campaign. For parliamentary elections, it
is clear that short-term effects are small and the most meaningful exposure comes from a
moderately recent exposure period. This lack of effects among the most recent exposure
category also refutes the hypothesis that female candidates run because there will be better
cross-level support from those currently in office in local government via the quota system.
In the parliament, it is clear also that effects of exposure decrease after moderate recency,
suggesting an impermanence in the effects – further supporting the hypothesis that the effect
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of quotas on later candidacies is concentrated specifically among those who gain political
experience as a result of the quotas that can be drawn upon in soon-upcoming political
campaigns.

2.8.3

Voter motivations and turnout

I use available measures of voter turnout in parliamentary and assembly elections to investigate whether there is evidence that female candidacy is increased indirectly by expectations
of enhanced voter turnout by groups potentially more likely to vote for female candidates.
For parliamentary constituencies, voter turnout measures are available separately by sex,
while available state assembly data contains only total voter turnout; Table 12 reports point
estimates from the same empirical framework as above.8 The precisely-estimated zero effect
of female leaders on measures of voter turnout in Table 13 provides evidence against the
existence of effects on the extensive margin of voting behavior.

2.9

Discussion

This paper is the first to provide evidence of effects of a quota policy in politics outside the
level of government in which the policy operates. Using a natural experiment in India in
which one third of leadership seats in local government were randomly reserved for women
across election cycles, I identify a causal response to these seat quotas among women contesting seats in later elections for state legislative bodies and the national parliament. This
suggests additional, longer-term effects of quotas on political dynamics, and effects outside
the particular bodies in which the quotas were active. Estimate magnitudes imply these quotas were responsible for a majority of the increase in female candidates in state legislature
8
India has a long history of reporting voter turnout measures separately by sex, originally made easily
available due to separate polling stations; although this practice is currently being phased out, the Elections
Commission continues to report turnout numbers separately.
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and parliamentary elections since the policy went into effect.
The cross-level effects of quotas in politics were linked to distinct groups of individuals
who either gained specific experience from the quotas or were not direct beneficiaries of the
policy, but continued contesting for office in areas that had had prior exposure to women
leaders. There was no overall increase in the probability of electing a woman despite the
increase in female candidates, so these additional candidates are precluded from accessing
positive incumbency benefits because they do not win the elections they contest. However,
there is some evidence of representation effects appearing when female candidates are selected
to run on major party tickets.
Effects on the extensive margin of voting are limited. The impermanence of the effects
is also potentially attributable to the political experience accorded by the policy to specific
individuals becoming less valuable over time, as the cross-level quota effects have an inverted
U-shape in recency of exposure. The additional female candidates disproportionately reduce
the vote share going to major party candidates, however, suggesting some possibility for
the candidates to affect the political platform. This, however, is left for future research. If
a policy goal is to increase substantive representation throughout politics, quotas in local
government have distinct, but limited, effects on representation in higher levels of the political
structure.
The findings have implications for the understanding of how quotas affect later candidacy
for higher positions in the occupation in which quotas operate. It is clear that follow-on
representation effects are not automatic, and may only be accessible in environments where
candidates can avail sufficient resources needed to compete for higher level positions.
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Appendix Table 2.1: Average years of exposure district chairperson quotas
State
Andhra Pradesh
Bihar
Gujarat
Haryana
Kerala
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
West Bengal
Overall sample

Mean
4.1
1.0
3.7
4.3
4.3
4.1
4.1
3.2
4.3
3.6
3.6

St. Dev.
2.6
0.9
2.6
0.9
1.8
2.2
1.7
2.8
1.0
2.9
2.3

Min.
0
0
0
3
0
0
1
0
3
0
0

Max.
11
2
10
5
8
8
7
8
5
10
11

N
22
27
17
12
14
27
13
12
26
16
186

Note: Source: Author’s calculations using data from Iyer et al (2012).
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Appendix Table 2.2: Summary statistics, intersected constituency returns datasets
Variable
Panel A: Assembly constituencies
Candidates
Number of female candidates
Whether area had any female candidate
Whether female candidate won election
Vote share for female candidates
Years exposure to chairperson reservation
Number of constituencies
Number of districts
N
Panel B: Parliamentary constituencies
Candidates
Number of female candidates
Whether area had any female candidate
Whether female candidate won election
Vote share for female candidates
Years exposure to chairperson reservation
Number of constituencies
Number of districts
N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

8.184
0.427
0.337
0.063
0.069
2.759

3.977
0.677
0.473
0.243
0.161
2.458
1,615
186
2,995

2
0
0
0
0
0

33
4
1
1
.973
10

13.495
0.857
0.520
0.109
0.085
3.396

5.911
1.087
0.500
0.312
0.175
2.315
278
186
1,375

4
0
0
0
0
0

38
5
1
1
.904
11

Note: Summary statistics reflect unconditional means across parliamentary and state
assembly constituencies intersected with district boundaries in the ten-state sample shown
in Table 1.

Cum. years exposure
State fixed effects
Mean of outcome
St. dev. of outcome
N

State legislatures
Female cand. Male cand.
(1)
(2)
-0.000
-0.005
(0.002)
(0.016)
Yes
Yes
0.42
7.86
0.20
2.92

Parliament
Female cand. Male cand.
(3)
(4)
0.007
0.007
(0.005)
(0.032)
Yes
Yes
0.90
12.5
0.28
3.52

2,995

1,375

Note: This table reports coefficient estimates of the effect of an additional year of exposure to women leaders on
measures of candidacy as predicted by pre-policy observables. Coefficients are from the estimation of equation (1) in
the text. Estimated with OLS. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by district and constituency in
parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05 , *** < .01.
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OLS
Female cand. Male cand.
(1)
(2)
Panel A: Unconditional
Cum. years exposure

State fixed effects
Panel B: Including covariates
Cum. years exposure

State fixed effects
Mean of outcome
St. dev. of outcome
N

Poisson
Female cand. Male cand.
(3)
(4)

0.015∗
(0.009)

-0.054
(0.058)

0.028∗
(0.016)

-0.008
(0.009)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.014∗
(0.008)

-0.051
(0.057)

0.025∗
(0.015)

-0.008
(0.009)

Yes
0.43
0.68

Yes
7.22
4.16

Yes
0.43
0.68

Yes
7.72
4.16

2,995
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Appendix Table 2.4: Effect of exposure to women leaders on state legislature candidacy.

Note: This table reports coefficient estimates of the effect of an additional year of exposure to women leaders on constituency-level metrics of candidacy. Coefficients are from the estimation of equation (1) in the text.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by district and constituency in parentheses. Significance levels
are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05 , *** < .01.
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OLS
Female cand. Male cand.
(1)
(2)
Panel A: Unconditional
Cum. years exposure

State fixed effects
Panel B: Including covariates
Cum. years exposure

State fixed effects
Mean of outcome
St. dev. of outcome
N

Poisson
Female cand. Male cand.
(3)
(4)

0.041∗
(0.021)

0.113
(0.109)

0.049∗∗
(0.025)

0.010
(0.009)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.035∗
(0.022)

0.109
(0.103)

0.044∗
(0.025)

0.009
(0.008)

Yes
0.89
1.04

Yes
12.61
5.64

Yes
0.89
1.04

Yes
12.61
5.64

1,375
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Appendix Table 2.5: Effect of exposure to women leaders on parliamentary candidacy

Note: This table reports coefficient estimates of the effect of an additional year of exposure to women leaders on constituency-level metrics of candidacy. Coefficients are from the estimation of equation (1) in the text.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by district and constituency in parentheses. Significance levels
are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05 , *** < .01.
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Outcome:

Count of female candidates

Interaction:

Panel A: State assemblies
Cum. years exposure

Exposure

Literacy

(1)

(2)

0.015∗
(0.009)

Interaction

State fixed effects
N
Panel B: Parliament
Cum. years exposure

Yes

N

(5)

Low-caste
population share
(6)

-0.026
(0.019)

0.016∗
(0.009)

0.015∗
(0.009)

0.016∗
(0.009)

0.014∗
(0.008)

0.056∗∗
(0.026)

0.053
(0.066)

0.026
(0.060)

0.051
(0.055)

0.117
(0.082)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

2,995
0.041∗
(0.021)

Interaction

State fixed effects

Sex Ratio

(3)

Educational
attainment
(4)

Yes

0.049
(0.056)

0.043∗∗
(0.020)

0.043∗∗
(0.020)

0.041∗
(0.021)

0.041∗
(0.021)

-0.009
(0.055)

-0.090
(0.206)

-0.253
(0.243)

-0.045
(0.183)

0.035
(0.245)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
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Appendix Table 2.6: Non-linearities in policy effects.

1,375
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Note: This table reports coefficient estimates of the effect of an additional year of exposure to women leaders on the
number of female candidates by constituency. Coefficients are from the estimation of equation (1) in the text, including
an additional interaction term with the measure indicated in column headers. Measures of local characteristics used
in columns (3)-(6) are unit standardized and main effects of the interaction terms are unreported. Estimated with
OLS. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by district and constituency in parentheses. Significance
levels are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05 , *** < .01.

Effect channel:
Measure:

Cum. years exposure
State fixed effects
Mean of outcome
St. dev. of outcome
N

Candidate supply
Prior local
politician
(1)
0.015∗
(0.007)
Yes
0.09
0.32

Response to voter demand
Female prev.
Female prev.
Parl. candidate state leg. candidate
(2)
(3)
0.003
0.026∗∗∗
(0.002)
(0.009)
Yes
Yes
0.02
0.19
0.15
0.39
1,375

Other
Known political
family
(4)
0.016∗
(0.009)
Yes
0.14
0.39

Note: This table reports coefficient estimates of the effect of an additional year of exposure to women leaders on
constituency-level metrics of within-level and cross-level repeat candidacies. Coefficients are from the estimation of
equation (1) in the text. Estimated with OLS. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by district and
constituency in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05 , *** < .01.
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Appendix Table 2.7: Effect of exposure to women leaders on parliamentary candidacy via career politicians.
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Outcome:

Panel A: State assemblies
Cum. years exposure

State fixed effects
N
Panel B: Parliament
Cum. years exposure

State fixed effects
N

Female share
of candidates
(1)

Female
vote share
(2)

Female
winner
(3)

0.00307∗∗
(0.00154)

0.00200
(0.00218)

0.00110
(0.00268)

Yes

Yes

0.00274
(0.00204)

0.00546
(0.00509)

Yes

Yes

Yes
2,995
0.01147
(0.01010)
Yes
1,375

Female finish in:
Top 5
Top 30%
(4)
(5)
0.01096
(0.00793)

0.00239
(0.00577)

Yes

Yes

0.01541
(0.01221)

0.01705
(0.01161)

Yes

Yes

Note: This table reports coefficient estimates of the effect of an additional year of exposure to women leaders on
segments of elections outcome finishes. Coefficients are from the estimation of equation (1) in the text. Estimated with
OLS. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by district and constituency in parentheses. Significance
levels are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05 , *** < .01.
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Cum. years exposure
State fixed effects
Mean of outcome
St. dev. of outcome
N

Female candidates,
major party
(1)
0.014
(0.017)
Yes
0.30
0.53

Female candidates, Female candidates,
minor party
independent
(2)
(3)
0.005
0.022∗∗
(0.012)
(0.011)
Yes
Yes
0.24
0.31
0.50
0.62
1,375

Vote share,
major party cand.
(4)
-0.030∗∗
(0.015)
Yes
0.47
0.60

Note: This table reports coefficient estimates of the effect of an additional year of exposure to women leaders on
constituency-level metrics of female candidates by party type. Coefficients are from the estimation of equation (1) in
the text. Estimated with OLS. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by district and constituency in
parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05 , *** < .01.
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Appendix Table 2.9: Effect of exposure to women leaders on parliamentary party competition.
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Appendix Table 2.10: Effect of exposure to women leaders on the election of female candidates conditional on party type.
Outcome:

Female
winner
(1)

Panel A: Female candidates>0
Cum. years exposure
0.016
(0.015)

Female finish in:
Top 5 Top 30%
(2)
(3)
0.011
(0.012)

0.013
(0.013)

Panel B: Major party female candidates>0
Cum. years exposure 0.034∗
0.023∗
0.023
(0.021) (0.012)
(0.017)
Panel C: Minor party female candidates>0
Cum. years exposure
0.022
0.021
0.046∗∗
(0.022) (0.023)
(0.023)
Panel D: Independent female candidates>0
Cum. years exposure -0.032∗ -0.012
-0.032∗
(0.017) (0.016)
(0.019)
Note: This table reports coefficient estimates of the effect of an additional year of
exposure to women leaders on an indicator for a female candidate winning the election.
Coefficients are from the estimation of equation (1) in the text. Estimated with OLS.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by district and constituency in
parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05 , *** < .01.

Cum. years exposure
Cum. years reserved * incumbent present
Incumbent present
N
Mean of outcome
St. dev. of outcome

Female candidates
Any incumbent
Major party
(0/1)
incumbent (0/1)
(1)
(2)
0.022
0.017
(0.033)
(0.034)
0.038
0.052
(0.047)
(0.048)
-0.231
-0.306∗
(0.177)
(0.185)
1375
1375
0.86
0.86

Female winner
Any incumbent
Major party
(0/1)
incumbent (0/1)
(3)
(4)
-0.001
-0.002
(0.012)
(0.012)
0.024∗
0.027∗∗
(0.012)
(0.012)
-0.096
-0.110∗
(0.061)
(0.059)
1375
1375
0.11
0.11

Note: This table reports coefficient estimates of the effect of an additional year of exposure to women leaders on the
number of female candidates and whether a female candidate wins the election. Coefficients are from the estimation of
equation (1) in the text, including an additional interaction term with the incumbency indicator indicated in column
headers. Estimated with OLS. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by district and constituency in
parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05 , *** < .01.
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Appendix Table 2.11: Effect of exposure to women leaders on the election of female candidates conditional on presence
of incumbent.
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Years reserved, 10-15 years prior

State legislatures
Female cand. Male cand.
(1)
(2)
0.022
0.070
(0.027)
(0.139)

Parliament
Female cand. Male cand.
(3)
(4)
-0.031
-0.003
(0.038)
(0.198)

Years reserved, 5-9 years prior

0.021
(0.017)

-0.125
(0.105)

0.091∗∗
(0.036)

0.168
(0.172)

Years reserved, 0-4 years prior

0.003
(0.016)

-0.028
(0.104)

0.012
(0.045)

0.150
(0.234)

Yes
0.43
0.68

Yes
7.22
4.16

Yes
0.89
1.04

Yes
12.61
5.64

State fixed effects
Mean of outcome
St. dev. of outcome
N

2,995

1,375
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Appendix Table 2.12: Separating effects of recent and past exposure.

Note: This table reports coefficient estimates of the effect of an additional year of exposure to women leaders in
different periods of recency on constituency-level metrics of candidacy and election outcomes. Coefficients are from
the estimation of equation (1) in the text. Estimated with OLS. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered
by district and constituency in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05 , *** < .01.
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Level:
Cum. years exposure
State fixed effects
Mean of outcome
St. dev. of outcome
N

Voter turnout
Parliament
(1)
0.00073
(0.00158)
Yes
0.62
0.15

Female share voters
Parliament
(2)
0.00037
(0.00052)
Yes
0.46
0.04
1,375

Female voter turnout
Parliament
(3)
0.00082
(0.00183)
Yes
0.60
0.16

Voter turnout
Assemblies
(4)
0.00302∗
(0.00170)
Yes
0.67
0.13
2,995

Note: This table reports coefficient estimates of the effect of an additional year of exposure to women leaders on
constituency-level metrics of voter turnout outcomes. Coefficients are from the estimation of equation (1) in the
text. Estimated with OLS. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by district and constituency in
parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05 , *** < .01.
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Appendix Table 2.13: Effect of exposure to women leaders on voter motivation and turnout.

76

CHAPTER 2. QUOTA POLICIES AND UPWARD MOBILITY

Appendix Figure 2.1: Policy variation in district chairperson exposure

Source: Author’s calculations using data from Iyer et al.
(2012).
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Appendix Figure 2.2: Variation in district exposure to seat reservations: timelines.
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Year

78

Notes: Author’s calculations using data from Iyer et al. (2012). In this figure, each position on the
vertical axis represents a separate district, with districts in the same states grouped together. For
each district, the appearance of a filled line indicates that the district chairperson seat was reserved
for a woman in that year (indicated on the horizontal axis). Districts that did not receive any period
of reservation are indicated in grey within each state series. States are ordered based on relative
geographical position.
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Appendix Figure 2.3: Falsification: predicting pre-policy female political participation with cumulative exposure.
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Note: These figures show the unconditional (left) and conditional (right) relationship between pre-policy
female political participation as measured through state and national legislature candidacy rates and years
of exposure to women leaders via seat quotas from 1995 to 2007. A flat line indicates no relationship
between pre-policy measures and eventual exposure.
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Candidate Panel dataset

Similar to transparency efforts in many other countries in recent decades, the Indian government has undertaken a large-scale process to digitize a great deal of its official records and
make them easily accessible to the public; elections data now available from various sources
(all ultimately sourced from the Elections Commission of India) are a prime example of this.
The Elections Commission (eci.nic.in) publishes numerous internet and PDF documents, as
well as digitized databases, containing detail on elections outcomes for directly-elected bodies
including the Lok Sabha and state legislative assemblies. Currently, digitized candidate lists
and outcomes by constituency are available for the entire history of the Lok Sabha; digitized
data for state assembly elections have been made available as part of Jensenius (2013).
Candidate linking was performed for all Lok Sabha elections from 1991 to 2014. Candidates were linked by taking all candidates in the focal year and assessing the closest name
match in the same state and constituency in the target year, up to a .2 Levenshtein distance.
This results in one closest name match (or multiples, in the case of an exact tie) in the target
year for each candidate in the focal year. Each match is then reviewed manually for sufficient
similarity across the two candidate name entries and a final match decision is made. Many
candidates had exact name matches. There are important aspects of this process to note:
1. The use of the closest match only induces the propensity for undercounting repeat
candidates, whose second or third match in the target year may have been proper (but
ignored by the current algorithm).
2. Some names were difficult to fully verify either way, particularly in the cases of candidates only having a single (usually given) name listed, in the case of common givensurname pairs, and/or in the case of election “fraud” or the running of several candidates with the same name. In the absence of other information, exact or near matches
of this nature were recorded as separate individuals.
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Sufficient criteria for assessing a positive match largely proceeded according to the following rules:
1. reordering of surname, given name, and/or
2. reordering or removal of an alias or honorifics, and/or
3. spelling differences via differences arising from name transliteration or spelling/typos.
In the case of the use of a single initial for a candidates’ given name in official records,
records were given closer scrutiny and required exact matching of the abbreviated name in
both records. Appendix Table 3 contains a summary of the matching process as it applied
to the state and national elections used in the analysis.
Table 3 highlights a number of facts about politics and politicians in India. First, repeat
candidacies in both levels of government are substantial, and a substantial share of these
repeat candidacies are by individuals who previously lost an election. (See for example,
6,870 repeat candidacies in state assembly elections contesting 4,094 seats; similarly in the
parliament, 1,004 repeat candidacies contesting 543 seats). Second, there is also substantial
movement of candidates across levels, with more then 1,000 candidates for the 2009 parliamentary elections having previously contested a state assembly seat. Third, the probability
of a woman contesting for parliament after a state legislature candidacy is three to four times
higher than for a previous male candidate, and this difference exists both for those who won
and lost their state legislature contest. Because of this, the parliamentary candidacies by
former assembly candidates are dominated by men and women who previously lost their
contest for state legislature seats. There is a non-trivial subset of candidates who contest
higher levels of political office over time, and these trajectories are not necessarily impeded
by a prior loss, either at the same or a lower level of government.
Any matching process of this nature is subject to some degree of error. False negatives
are most likely to arise in the cases of candidates using either a single (or a very common)
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name which cannot be definitively assigned across elections, or in the case of a candidate’s
name being represented or recorded substantially differently across elections so as to appear
a different candidate. False positives are likely to occur only in the case of very common
names, or the extreme case of multiple individuals running in the same state with very
similar (or exactly-matching) names. The above is unlikely to induce bias in the analysis
for two reasons: these occurrences are far less common for female candidates simply due to
the number of female candidates, who are more readily identifiable and less likely to present
false positives, and there is no reason for such cases to be related to variation in exposure to
women leaders.

A2

Assigning constituency treatment levels and population weights

As mentioned in the text, district boundaries, which determine exposure to chairperson seat
reservations, do not overlap with parliamentary constituencies (shown in Appendix Figure
1 above) or state assembly constituencies.
I begin with an administrative shapefile of Indian districts as of 2001. (Note that the
district chairperson infomation has been adjusted to account for changes in district definitions relative to 2001 definitions.) I then overlay boundary files for the 2009 Lok Sabha
constituencies and pre-delimitation (2007) state assembly constituencies.
I then find the intersection of district and constituency boundaries to create distinct units
which correspond to polygons defined by unique overlaps of district-constituency pairs. This
process creates a set of unique geographic areas defined by the area pertaining to a unique
combination of a district and constituency.
Using data from the Gridded Population of the World for India (adjusted population
counts by 2.5 arc-minute grid), I then assign population counts to the unique area produced
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by the above process for both the parliamentary-constituency-district and state assembly
constituency-district intersected areas. A GIS-format workspace containing the original
boundaries and constructed intersections and joins is available in the supplementary materials posted on my website.
It is important to note that boundary segments that are coterminous in reality may not
be defined precisely so in mapping files. Deviations in the path of overlapping boundaries will
cause this process to generate small areas which incorrectly indicate an erroneous districtconstituency overlap. (Such occurrences are most obviously seen when an overlapping area is
defined by a constituency-district pair in different states; neither districts nor constituencies
comprise areas in multiple states.) For both state assembly and parliamentary constituencies,
I partially correct for this process by dropping any overlapping areas from district and
constituencies indicated to be in from different states (such occurrences are not possible).
Summary statistics of these areas are presented in Appendix Tables 4 and 5.

A3

Web research on 2009 Parliamentary candidates

Because there is no single resource detailing the background of political candidates, I relied
on web research to capture basic fields about 2009 female parliamentary candidates. These
included information on whether the candidate was previously involved in local government,
in other (state or national) government, and/or whether the candidate was related to any
known politicians.
Searches for this information was undertaken by:
1. Searching the [full/part name] of the candidate in the [state] Election Commission
website
2. Searching the [full/part name] of the candidate with “panchayat election” added
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3. Searching the [full/part name] of the candidate with “zilla parishad” added
4. Searching the [full/part name] of the candidate with “municipal election” added
5. Searching the [full/part name] of the candidate with [party name] added
6. Searching the [full/part name] of the candidate with [history/background] and [political
party name] added
7. Searching the [full/part name] of the candidate in the past (before 2009) [panchayat/zilla
parishad/municipal] election results available from the [state] election commission website
There were several additional considerations made when identifing the candidate matched
to information found. Whenever there was confusion about whether the person found is the
focal candidate, any of a combination of the following validation steps were undertaken:
1. Category is the same - General/SC/ST/OBC
2. The place of residence/earlier political activity of the candidate falls under the Lok
Sabha constituency from which the candidate stood for the 2009 Lok Sabha election
3. Party is the same. (Note that this may not be true always as sometimes the candidates
leave their party.)
4. Age - if the candidate age is 25 at the time of the 2009 Lok Sabha election then when
sourcing the results of earlier elections, say from 2004 or before, if the same name is
encountered and even the political party name matches still that candidate would be
not assigned that particular political history since it is unlikely that a candidate at the
age of 20 or less would be contesting in an election.
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Appendix Table 6 contains a summary of the information found; further detail (by candidate) on this research can be found in the supplementary materials posted on the author’s
website.

A4

Appendix Tables and Figures
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Appendix Table A1: Timing of state assembly elections
State
2003
Andhra Pradesh
Bihar
Gujarat
Haryana
Kerala
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
X
West Bengal

2004
X

2005

2006

2007

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Source: Table presents indicators for the calendar
year in which state assembly elections are observed.
Appendix Table A2: Predicting cumulative exposure with pre-policy district characteristics.

School enrollment rate, 1987
Women’s literacy rate, 1991
Mean household cons. per cap., 1987
Average household size, 1987
Sex ratio, 1987
Share SC/ST, 1991
Female fraction parl. cand., 1991
Female fraction AC cand., pre-policy
N
F-statistic on test of joint significance

(1)
-1.899
(1.559)
2.090
(2.831)
-0.007
(0.005)
-0.282
(0.220)
3.332
(3.808)
-0.104
(1.147)
3.488
(4.853)
-0.535
(11.742)
179
.792

Note: This table reports the test of joint significance of measures of pre-policy area conditions on eventual policy exposure as
of 2007. Estimated with OLS. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by ∗
< .1, ** < .05 , *** < .01.
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Appendix Table A3: Summary statistics, state assembly and parliamentary candidate panel
dataset

Panel A: Aggregates
Num. candidates, men
Num. candidates, women
Frac. candidates, women
Men elected
Women elected
Frac. elected, women
Repeat contest, men
Repeat contest, women
Prior AC candidate, men
of which was elected in prior AC
Prior AC candidate, women
of which was elected in prior AC
Panel B: Constituency-level measures
Number of constituencies
Avg. number candidates
Avg. number female candidates
Frac. const. with any female candidate
Frac. const. electing a female candidate
Frac. const. electing a female candidate, conditional
Frac. of votes for female candidates (net)

State Assemblies
(2003-2009)

Parliament
(2009)

34,129
2,220
0.061
3,838
256
0.063
6,493
287

7,257
543
0.070
485
58
0.107
1,062
42

-

1,009
101
138
22

4,078
9
0.538
0.392
0.063
0.159
0.068

543
15
1
0.600
0.107
0.178
0.086

Source: Author’s calculations from candidate panel dataset constructed using data from Jensenius (2015)
and the Indian Elections Commission. Table shows aggregate candidacy measures across state and national
legislatures by gender (top panel) and constituency-area summary statistics (bottom panel).

Appendix Table A4: District - assembly constituencies intersected polygons: summary statistics
Variable
Mean
Polygon area
0.02868
Polygon area, same state
0.03278
Polygon area, different state 0.01036

(Std. Dev.)
(0.06614)
(0.07190)
(0.02026)

Min. Max.
N
0
3.09819 9,579
0
3.09819 7,829
0
0.32990 1,750
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Appendix Table A5: District - parliamentary constituencies intersected polygons: summary
statistics

Polygon
Polygon
Polygon
Polygon

Variable
Mean (Std. Dev.)
area, full sample
0.07879
(0.19471)
area, same state
0.09930
(0.21477)
area, different state 0.00256
(0.00478)
area, small polygons 0.00336
(0.00588)

Min. Max.
N
0
3.75577 3,527
0
3.75577 2,779
0
0.06240 748
0
0.03995 2,588

Appendix Table A6: Candidate histories summary information
N female candidates
Background information found
Background
Prior higher office candidacy
Prior local government service
Higher office candidacy and local government experience

265
102
Candidates Share
60
58.8
27
26.5
4
3.9

Prior higher office candidacy and political family
Prior local government and political family

21
2

20.6
2.0

Only family ties

19

18.6
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Appendix Table A7: Effect of exposure to women leaders on candidacy: aggregated sample.
OLS
Female cand. Male cand.
(1)
(2)
Panel A: State Legislatures
Cum. years exposure
State fixed effects
Mean of outcome
St. dev. of outcome
N
Panel B: Parliament
Cum. years exposure

State fixed effects
Mean of outcome
St. dev. of outcome
N

0.013
(0.008)
Yes
0.44
0.68

Poisson
Female cand. Male cand.
(3)
(4)

-0.032
(0.031)
Yes
7.72
4.11

0.026∗
(0.016)
Yes
0.44
0.68

-0.005
(0.005)
Yes
7.72
4.11

1,615
0.051∗
(0.029)

0.147
(0.132)

0.060∗
(0.032)

0.012
(0.011)

Yes
0.89
1.04

Yes
12.7
5.74

Yes
0.89
1.04

Yes
12.7
5.74

279

Note: This table reports coefficient estimates of the effect of an additional year of exposure to women leaders on constituency-level metrics of candidacy. Coefficients are from
the estimation of equation (1) in the text. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
clustered by district and constituency in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by
∗ < .1, ** < .05 , *** < .01.
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Appendix Table A8: Effect of exposure to women leaders on candidacy: size-weighted estimations.

Cum. years exposure

State fixed effects
Mean of outcome
St. dev. of outcome
N

State Assemblies
Female cand. Male cand.
(1)
(2)
∗
0.014
-0.030
(0.008)
Yes
0.43
0.68

(0.060)
Yes
7.22
4.16
2,995

Parliament
Female cand. Male cand.
(3)
(4)
∗∗
0.045
0.090
(0.021)
Yes
0.89
1.04

(0.107)
Yes
12.61
5.64
1,375

Note: This table reports coefficient estimates of the effect of an additional year of exposure to women leaders on constituency-level metrics of candidacy. Coefficients are from
the estimation of equation (1) in the text. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
clustered by district and constituency in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by
∗ < .1, ** < .05 , *** < .01.

Cum. years exposure
Cum. years reserved * incumbent present
Incumbent present
N
Mean of outcome
St. dev. of outcome

Female candidates
Female winner
Any
Major party
Any
Major party
incumbent running incumbent running incumbent running incumbent running
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.022
0.017
-0.001
-0.002
(0.033)
(0.034)
(0.012)
(0.012)
0.038
0.052
0.024∗
0.027∗∗
(0.047)
(0.048)
(0.012)
(0.012)
-0.231
-0.306∗
-0.096
-0.110∗
(0.177)
(0.185)
(0.061)
(0.059)
1375
1375
1375
1375
0.86
0.86
0.11
0.11
1.09
1.09
0.31
0.31

Note: This table reports coefficient estimates of the effect of an additional year of exposure to women leaders on the number of female
candidates and whether a female candidate wins the election. Coefficients are from the estimation of equation (1) in the text, including an
additional interaction term with the incumbency indicator indicated in column headers. Estimated with OLS. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors clustered by district and constituency in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by ∗ < .1, ** < .05 , *** < .01.

CHAPTER 2. QUOTA POLICIES AND UPWARD MOBILITY

Appendix Table A9: Effect of exposure to women leaders on candidacy and election outcomes: interactions with incumbent
presence.
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Appendix Figure A1: District and parliamentary constituency boundaries in Maharashtra.
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Appendix Figure A2: Coefficient magnitude and significance under varying sample restrictions.
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Note: Figures depict coefficient magnitudes and t-statistics across samples that progressively drop
larger component areas based on constituency population share, ranging from zero to up to 80
percent of constituency population share.
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